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ABSTRACT 
 The foremost task of every military is to win the nation’s wars and protect its 
freedom, independence, and territorial integrity. Today, great powers are fielding 
powerful combined-arms militaries capable of operating in various domains. However, as 
the big players’ military power increases, the political and military leaders of small states 
face a challenge of the utmost importance—how to retain crucial military capabilities and 
potentially prevail against a technologically and numerically superior enemy. 
Unfortunately, small states often try to emulate the warfighting capabilities of great 
powers. However, this approach is associated with a risk that, due to limited financial, 
technological, material, and human resources, a small nation’s military would not pose a 
credible deterrence and, if deterrence fails, may not repel a superior assailant. Yet, there 
exists another strategic alternative. This thesis introduces the irregular warfare concept as 
a strategic option that could increase the chances of a small nation’s military to defy even 
a conventionally much stronger foe. The concept is analyzed in the context of command 
and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and 
sustainment—in regular military parlance known as joint functions. This work distilled 
applicable lessons from various asymmetric conflicts and proposes irregular warfare as a 
viable strategy that can imbalance a superior enemy and result in an unlikely victory. 
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…since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in 
question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the 
weak suffer what they must. 
—Thucydides: The Melian Dialogue1 
A. THE PROSPECTS OF AN INTERSTATE WAR 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 
ended the forty years of preparation for a gigantic conventional conflict between the armies 
of the Western and Eastern blocs. After the Cold War, with Europe reunited and Russia 
severely politically, economically, and militarily weakened, European armies reoriented 
on peacekeeping and stabilization missions. After the tragedy of 9/11, the U.S. military and 
its NATO allies embarked on two decades of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
operations. And although Operation Iraqi Freedom started with a conventional campaign 
that led to decisive and swift destruction of the Iraqi army, the focus had been put on light 
and highly mobile expeditionary forces. However, the possibility of a larger interstate 
military confrontation has never really disappeared. Despite the ongoing Global War on 
Terror and the fight against violent extremist organizations, several hotspots that could 
escalate into an interstate war exist across the world. North Korea’s nuclear program is a 
source of unabated tensions on the Korean peninsula. Increasing Chinese assertiveness in 
the South China Sea, backed by intensive military build-up, raises the risks of conflict in 
this region full of antagonistic national interests. Continuous disputes over the Iranian 
nuclear program have the potential to throw the entire Middle East region into another 
bloody mayhem. Europe is not an exception. The Russian annexation of Crimea and the 
Kremlin’s aggressive posture in the Baltics and the Arctic region poses a security challenge 
that forced the NATO allies to increase their military presence on the alliance’s 
northeastern flank. Indeed, the end of the Cold War confrontation did not lead to “universal 
 
1 Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War 
and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Longman, 2001), 38. 
2 
harmony” and “the end of history.”2 Today’s world often resembles more of an anarchic 
“self-help” system than an arena where international institutions play an important role.  
To prepare for a possible all-out war, the world’s great powers are increasing their 
military spending and investing in the research, development, and acquisition of 
sophisticated and powerful weapon systems that will have a profound effect on future 
battlefields. Robust networked forces comprising command-and-control systems enhanced 
by artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonic missiles and long-range fire systems, advanced 
electronic warfare (EW) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities, and enhanced cyber capabilities, will play a crucial role in twenty-first-century 
warfare. In his March 2018 address to the Academy of Military Sciences, Chief of the 
Russian General Staff General Valery Gerasimov underlined, that 
A shift is taking place toward the comprehensive destruction of the enemy 
based on integrating the effort of all strike and fire resources into a uniform 
system. The role of radio-electronic warfare, information-technical effects, 
and information-psychological effects is expanding. The increase in the ratio 
of precision weapons ensures the precise and selective destruction of targets, 
including critically important ones, in real time.3  
Integrated information collection, analysis, and dissemination systems designed to 
streamline the entire decision-making cycle were also highlighted by Gerasimov: 
Recce-strike and recce-fire profiles are being created with the aim of 
ensuring the efficiency and continuity of fire effects against the enemy. 
Reconnaissance information and information-control systems are being 
integrated with weapons systems of services and branches. Work is being 
done on the creation of an automated interservice recce-strike system. The 
result of this should be a reduction of the temporal parameters of the decision 
cycle for a fire task—from reconnaissance to target destruction—by two to 
two and a half times. That said, the precision of destruction will increase by 
 
2 According to Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama, an American political scientist and economist, the 
conclusion of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union heralded the upcoming worldwide 
triumph of liberal democracy and the free market. Although these assertions were rejected by many as 
extremely flawed, some point out the misinterpretation of his work and argue for his conclusions that 
liberal democracy will become prevalent in the long term as the best form of government. See Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, Inc., 1992).  
3 Harold Orenstein, “Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov’s 2018 Presentation to the 




one and a half to two times, and the capabilities for guiding precision 
weapons will broaden.4 
However, as great power military capabilities increase, many small states face a 
vitally important question—how to prevail in a military confrontation with an enemy that 
is technologically and numerically superior.5 The famous Melian Dialogue is a striking 
example of what may happen when a weak actor meets the high-and-mighty despot 
possessing an overwhelming military power. The result is an uneasy situation when the 
underdog must either give in or face harsh consequences. Yet there is an alternative. 
Irregular warfare represents a strategy option of how to exploit Goliath’s arrogance, turn it 
against him, and give David a chance to survive.  
B. SMALL STATES AND A GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION 
Every state, regardless of its size and power, strives for security and survival. 
History teaches us that security is something that should never be taken for granted. 
Therefore, the nation’s military capabilities are of the utmost importance. However, the 
level of military spending and modernization of a great power is generally out of the 
financial and technological resources of small states. Yet many of them pursue a force 
structure that mirrors the combined-arms militaries of great powers. Such an approach, 
however, implies several drawbacks. First, for a small country’s military budget, 
acquisition, let alone development, of a technologically advanced weapon system in 
adequate numbers and operating expenses during the weapons’ life cycle pose a heavy 
financial burden that is often difficult or even impossible to tackle. Second, the cost of 
procurement of modern high-tech weapons is often counterbalanced by budget cuts in the 
area of training that negatively affects operational readiness. Finally, limited human 
resources also handicap the small country’s ability to field a military that would pose a 
credible conventional deterrence. All these factors indicate that in a conventional conflict 
 
4 Orenstein, “Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov’s 2018 Presentation to the General Staff 
Academy,” 5–6. 
5 While there are several definitions of a small state, Michael I. Handel’s definition of a small state as 
“a state which is unable to contend in war with the great powers on anything like equal terms,” suits the 
goal of this thesis the best. See Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (Gainsborough: 
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1990), 36.  
4 
against a great power a small state’s armed forces would be most likely decisively 
defeated.6 Of course, conventional forces still play a significant role in a small state’s 
national defense strategy. However, sole reliance on conventional military build-up may 
not be enough. Yet there is a way how to enhance a small country’s defense plans. As the 
former commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) 
Lieutenant General Mark C. Schwartz points out, “An important lesson from the Russian 
annexation of Crimea and subsequent assault on Donetsk was that resistance operations are 
a necessary and critical part of any national defense plan.”7 
In his NPS master’s thesis, Sandor Fabian proposes the creation of state-organized 
irregular defense forces and incorporation of an irregular warfare concept into national 
defense plans of small states.8 Indeed, the incorporation of irregular warfare strategy and 
techniques seems to be a viable option of how to oppose an invasion of a much stronger 
enemy and prevail in an asymmetric struggle. Seth G. Jones finds that “since World War 
II, insurgent groups achieved victory by overthrowing a government or gaining 
independence in 35 percent insurgencies that ended.”9 According to Ivan Arreguín-Toft, 
in the last 200 years, almost 30 percent of asymmetric conflicts were won by the 
conventionally weaker side.10 Furthermore, the overall number of asymmetric conflicts 
won by an underdog goes even higher after the Second World War.11 These studies only 
confirm the general truth that irregular warfare is a viable warfighting option of the weak.  
 
6 The tragic fate of the Polish army in September 1939 is reminiscent of a futile attempt to 
conventionally match a much powerful enemy. The Russo-Georgian war in 2008 is another example of 
failure that is almost inevitable when a small state tries to imitate a great power.  
7 Mark C. Schwartz, “Commander Foreword,” in Resistance Views: Tartu Resistance Seminar Essays 
on Unconventional Warfare and Small State Resistance, 2014, ed. Kevin D. Stringer and Glennis F. Napier 
(MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special University Press, 2018), vii. 
8 Sandor Fabian, “Professional Irregular Defense Forces: The Other Side of COIN” (master’s thesis, 
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 160, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/7338/12Jun_Fabian.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
9 Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 9. 
10 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: The Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 96. 
11Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 97. 
5 
C. RESEARCH SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE 
A small state’s chance to successfully repel a conventional military attack of a great 
power by using a direct force-on-force approach is very limited. Too often near to zero. 
Conversely, there are numerous historical examples when a weak side wreaked havoc on 
superior enemy forces by using an irregular warfare approach. From the standpoint of 
national survival, a deliberately pre-planned and prepared irregular warfare campaign may 
significantly increase a nation’s chance to successfully oppose a superior force.  
On this subject, countless numbers of books, studies, and analyses have been 
written. A great deal of research on this issue has also been done by many U.S. and 
international students at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.12 These 
studies offer valuable insights from the standpoint of policy, military strategy or sociology 
and, what is of particular value, draw on various backgrounds, perspectives, experience, 
and knowledge of authors from many countries. And given the nature of many conflicts of 
today, the research of this complex approach to warfare is far from over, indeed.  
The objective of this thesis is to come up with an analysis of the phenomenon of 
irregular warfare from more of a military perspective. The goal is to introduce the value of 
irregular warfare and present it as a viable strategic option for a small state and its military. 
The thesis seeks to distill relevant facets of irregular warfare from various distant or recent 
irregular warfare examples and look at them through the eyes of an irregular force 
commander. Hopefully, this work will contribute to a better understanding of irregular 
warfare as an effective force multiplier and an efficient way of how to increase a nation’s 
military power. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is composed of four chapters. Chapter I briefly summarizes current 
thorny security issues of the re-emerging era of great power competition, and related 
 
12 Among others, see David J. Woods and Paul G. Bailey, “Relational Maneuver: How to Wage 
Irregular Warfare and MARSOC’s Strategic Application” (2018), Eric D. King and Matthew R. White, 
“Strategic Usefulness of Conventional Force/Special Operations Force Interdependence in Irregular 
Warfare” (2017), Gabor Santa, “Conditions for Adopting an Irregular Defense Strategy” (2014), or Johann 
Hindert, “German Views of Irregular Warfare” (2015).  
6 
security challenges for small states. Chapter II briefly describes the two most-common 
defense policies of small states and their pros and cons. Subsequently, irregular warfare is 
introduced as a strategic option for a small state. Chapter III, the core of the thesis, focuses 
on the analysis of an irregular warfare campaign. The closing chapter offers final remarks 
and recommendations which might be worth implementing by armed forces of a small 
state.  
To analyze irregular warfare, this research uses qualitative analysis to distill 
relevant facets of irregular warfare from various distant or recent irregular warfare 
campaigns. Applicable lessons from conventional wars and non-military security issues are 
included. These distinctive features are analyzed in the context of command and control, 
information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. In 
a regular military, these are known as the joint functions—“related capabilities and 
activities grouped together to help JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] integrate, synchronize, 
and direct joint operations.”13 As far as irregular forces are concerned, they too represent 
a “joint” force. After all, a textbook resistance movement and insurgency are organized 
around guerrilla forces, underground, and auxiliary forces.14 To maintain this multifarious 
force’s effectiveness and coherence, irregular leaders must demonstrate a great deal of wit, 
skill, and knowledge. Hence, it is obvious that, in general, irregular force commanders must 
cope with the same operational issues as their regular military counterparts.  
 
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), III-1, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910. 
14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), II-
8, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf. 
7 
II. SMALL STATE’S POLICY AND IRREGULAR WARFARE   
Because the essence of grand strategy is the subordination of strategy to 
policy, whatever policy may be, its fulfillment must be within the power of 
strategy to attain. 
               —J. F. C. Fuller15 
A. GRAND STRATEGY AND STRATEGY 
Security is the most vital interest of every state regardless of its size, resources, and 
might. States apply diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of national 
power to pursue their security policy objectives and the preservation of their own 
statehood, independence, and territorial integrity. This is often described by the term 
“grand strategy,” as opposed to “strategy” that is, as Basil Liddell Hart points out, “best 
confined to its literal meaning of ‘generalship’—the actual direction of military force.”16  
According to Barry Posen, “a grand strategy must identify likely threats to the 
state’s security and it must devise political, economic, military, and other remedies for 
those threats.”17 For national leaders, the task of yielding a viable grand strategy comprises 
not only the understanding of the complexity and nature of the threats but also careful 
consideration of the limitation of the state’s resources and ways how to employ them. In 
terms of Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s U.S. Army War College strategy model, “the strategy must 
identify an appropriate balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the 
objectives, and the resources available.”18 And since resources are generally limited and 
their use is not flawless, every strategy is associated with some degree of risk that must be 
 
15 J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and 
Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992), 66. 
16 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 10. 
17 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the 
World Wars (New York: Cornel University Press, 1984), 13.  
18 H. Richard Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College 
Strategy Model,” in U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume I: Theory of War 
and Strategy 5th Edition, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2012), 46. 
8 
analyzed and taken into consideration.19 As Harry R. “Rich” Yarger emphasizes, “a valid 
strategy must find a balance among ends, ways, and means consistent with the risk the 
nation is willing to accept.”20 This goes for great powers as well as small states of which 
resources and options are much more limited.  
It is reasonable to conclude that small states are given less scope for strategic 
failure. Unlike great powers that can fail repeatedly and yet finally resist a crisis, small 
states cannot afford such luxury. History gives many examples of subjugated small nations 
which did not withstand the onslaught of the strong. In the late 1930s, countries like 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway or Belgium could not do much but wait until they were 
smashed by the maelstrom. Indeed, amid a great power confrontation, the underdogs often 
face highly unfavorable conditions; however, a wrong strategy only reduces their 
prospects. 
Fabian identifies four major grand strategies employed by small states—
membership in a politico-military alliance, imitation of military capabilities of a great 
power, declaration of neutrality, and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.21 
Appeasement—“the reduction of tensions between [two states] by the methodical removal 
of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them”22—also represents 
another strategic option. All these strategies, separately or combined, have pros and cons. 
Currently, small states—at least in Europe—combine two main strategies: joining a 
military alliance and conventional military build-up.  
B. JOINING A MILITARY ALLIANCE 
For a small state, joining a military alliance is indeed a sound choice. The combined 
military power of allies serves as a force multiplier and compensates for the military 
weakness of a small state. Additionally, membership in a military alliance yields additional 
 
19 Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy,” 49. 
20 Yarger, 50. 
21 Fabian, “Professional Irregular Defense Forces,” 18. 
22 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our 
Time, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 250. 
9 
benefits. Besides security guaranties, a small state’s military can gain access to military 
technologies and know-how, take advantage of educational and training opportunities, and 
make use of capabilities that would otherwise remain beyond its reach. However, 
membership in a military alliance as a grand strategy option is also associated with some 
degree of risk.  
By joining a military alliance, small states count on extended deterrence of a 
potential aggressor posed by the military power of their allies and their willingness to use 
it. Extended deterrence, as opposed to direct deterrence, “encompasses discouraging 
attacks on third parties, such as allies or partners.”23 As such, it is political in nature and 
presents, as Timothy W. Crawford points out, “a picture of strategic interaction among at 
least three strategic actors that ‘converges on the central point’ of an attempt by one of 
them to deter another from attacking a third.”24 Thus, extended deterrence raises the 
credibility problem which results from the discrepancy between the deterring state’s 
interests and interest in its allies.25 In other words, the deterrer must accept the cost of 
allied commitments and show its willpower to fight an enemy who may not pose a direct 
threat to the deterrer’s country.  
Thus, successful deterrence lies in persuading a potential aggressor that aggression 
will be resolutely opposed. The authors of a recent RAND study on deterrence conclude 
that “simply stating a commitment is not enough; a defender must make it clear that it has 
no choice but to react.”26 This combination of commitment and clarity of intent towards 
the challenger is indeed crucial for any military alliance. As the former United States 
Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger argues, “even if there 
should be agreement that a given act constitutes aggression, the willingness of the powers 
 
23 Michael J. Mazarr et al., What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of 
Interstate Aggression, RR-2451-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 9, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2451/RAND_RR2451.pdf. 
24 Timothy W. Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and 
Complexity in Theory and Policy,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T. V. Paul, 
Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 279. 
25 Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence,” 282. 
26 Michael J. Mazarr et al., What Deters and Why, 29–30. 
10 
to run risks to oppose will differ. A state will not easily risk its survival to defeat aggression 
not explicitly directed against its national existence.”27 Needless to say, the lack of 
willpower can be deepened because, as Kissinger notes, “against an aggressor skilled in 
presenting ambiguous challenges there will occur endless wrangling over whether a 
specific challenge in fact constitutes aggression and about the measures to deal with it.”28  
For a small country, joining a military alliance offers security guarantees that can 
immensely increase the country’s survivability in a tumultuous world. Moreover, 
membership in a defense pact is often associated with benefits other than solely military. 
Among others, a country having strong allies can act more confidently and assertively at 
the international stage. Such a country can attract foreign investors and access valuable 
know-how. Not to mention that allied capabilities and cooperation with partners highly 
increase a country’s options of how to deal with various non-military crisis situations like 
a massive flow of refugees, industrial or natural disasters, or even a pandemic. Yet not 
surprisingly, no alliance poses an “all-in-one” solution. Besides the credibility issue—the 
Achilles’ heel of every military alliance, no defense can be strong everywhere. As 
Frederick the Great noted, who tries to defend everywhere defends nowhere. Thus, the 
willingness to fight on behalf of some other is not the only issue. The alliance’s (lack of) 
ability to muster adequate forces on time is another contingency that must be planned for. 
For a country’s defense highly reliable on the timely arrival of allied forces it means to fill 
that time gap with a workable strategy.      
C. CONVENTIONAL MILITARY BUILDUP 
Efforts to imitate great powers’ combined-arms militaries are common for many 
small states. However, this approach may prove risky due to several factors. A small state’s 
limited resources significantly hinder the foundation of sufficient training, technological, 
logistic, and raw material base that is indispensable to create and maintain a military 
comparable to that of a great power. Not to mention scanty human resources that still play 
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a significant role in fielding strong conventional armed forces. Limited financial resources, 
of course, pose another limitation. However, it is not solely about defense expenditures. 
Indeed, procurement of modern weapon systems and their maintenance cost is financially 
challenging. But even the best-equipped military is useless when it consists of untrained 
personnel and uneducated leadership. In his article on economic development and military 
effectiveness, Michael Beckley points out that today’s extremely lethal battlefield requires 
military professionals to master their profession at the tactical as well as operational 
level.29 To retain and improve their skillsets, military personnel must be continually 
trained and educated. This requires, as Beckley notes, “a robust infrastructure of 
government, academic, and private research institutions, as well as a constant supply of 
human capital to staff them.”30 This is not cheap, indeed. Neither can such an infrastructure 
be founded on short notice.  
Today’s combined-arms militaries are equipped with state-of-the-art armament. In 
their effort to keep up with advancement in the weapon’s technology and the need for 
modernization, however, small states are often confronted with a significant setback. The 
transfer of technologies is often required by the technologically less developed countries 
when they acquire new weapons. That is because the access to modern technologies is 
critically important to maintain the country’s technological and logistic self-sufficiency in 
the event of a conflict. But this seldom happens, chiefly due to political and economic 
reasons or simply because the technological know-how is often a highly protected secret. 
It was just the transfer of key technologies that was recently withheld from Poland due to 
restrictions imposed by the U.S. government.31 The transfer was pursued by the Polish 
Ministry of Defense as a part of the Polish-U.S. intergovernmental talks concerning the 
procurement of HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) launchers. The Polish 
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Army will finally acquire this advanced artillery system.32 However, without so desirable 
access to technological know-how, the Poles will remain logistically dependent on their 
American allies, not to mention the system’s life-cycle maintenance costs that will not be 
under the Polish control.  
Today’s great powers’ militaries constitute highly networked systems that “link 
weapons and troops to sensors, satellites, and command centers.”33 But as Beckley notes, 
“countries may be able to purchase certain aspects of these systems from abroad, but only 
developed states will have the supporting infrastructure necessary to assimilate state-of-
the-art military technologies and integrate them into a cohesive, lethal whole.”34 Small 
states’ militaries also need to modernize their arsenals to keep up with technological 
advancement and retain crucial capabilities. However, small states must spend their limited 
resources prudently to make their armed forces combat effective against a much stronger 
enemy. Needless to say, reasonable defense expenditures should be based on careful 
analysis and considerations of the appropriate force composition and strategy on how to 
use it.  
D. ON THE BASICS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE  
Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, a World War II paratroop commander 
and postwar professor of constitutional and international law, calls irregular warfare “the 
war out of the dark.”35 Throughout history, this kind of warfare was waged by many. It 
was fought from the depths of inaccessible jungles, from the caves of remote mountain 
areas, or the dunes of vast deserts. Skillful irregular warfare warriors took advantage of 
concealment among the populace and knowledge of local areas, avoidance of a decisive 
battle with a superior enemy, and ability to strike him at will to break him by “thousand 
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cuts.” To undermine their enemy’s will to fight, the masters of irregular warfare employed 
a variety of what is today called tactics, techniques, and procedures.  
The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States defines irregular warfare 
“as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over 
the relevant population(s).”36 However, this definition is somewhat misleading. Irregular 
warfare is generally conceived of as a conflict between a state’s regular military and a non-
state actor—partisans, terrorists, freedom-fighters, etc. This is indeed true. Irregular 
warfare represents a set of activities conducted in support of a non-state actor against a 
nation-state (Unconventional Warfare) or vice-versa—in support of a nation-state against 
insurgents or terrorists (Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, 
etc).37 And yet, as noted by John Arquilla, a renowned American analyst and professor of 
international relations, this definition “reflects a curious lack of attention to the idea that 
irregular warfare may be employed by a standing military in a general conflict.”38 Instead 
of focusing on actors, Arquilla emphasizes small units and their roles and actions “across 
the three fundamental forms of irregular warfare: insurgency, terror, and special 
operations.”39 Throughout the centuries, actions of small dispersed units have been used 
by clever warriors to avoid a direct confrontation with a superior force that would result 
only in senseless destruction of their forces. Conversely, elusiveness and ostensible 
omnipresence of smaller elements often helped a weaker side achieve physical and moral 
overstretch of a conventionally superior enemy, make his forces unable to tighten the 
controlling net over an operational area, and finally render him unwilling to fight a futile 
war.40    
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As already mentioned, irregular warfare is generally considered an asymmetric 
struggle between non-state actors and much stronger regular forces of their foes. However, 
the history of human conflict offers many examples when standing militaries employed 
their forces in an irregular way. During the American War of Independence, the American 
general Nathanael Greene skillfully combined unconventional hit-and-run tactics with 
conventional maneuvers to fight the superior British forces.41 After Napoleon’s Grande 
Armée invaded Russia in 1812, Russian’s long-range cavalry raiding forces brilliantly 
commanded by Denis Vasilyevich Davidov wrought havoc upon French supply lines, 
attacked security outposts, freed prisoners of war, and organized resistance in the French 
rear.42 According to military historian David Chandler, “the contribution of Russian 
soldiery was only of secondary importance; the raids of Cossacks and partisan bands 
did more harm to the Emperor than all the endeavors of the regular field armies of 
Holy Russia.”43   
Irregular warfare did not lose its relevance in the age of industrial warfare either. 
During the First World War, the combination of the industrial power of modern states and 
strategic mobility (railway) enabled the belligerents to muster forces on a by then 
unimaginable scale. However, when these forces, which tactical mobility resembled that 
of the armies of the Napoleonic wars, met the devastating combined effect of machine 
guns, quick-firing artillery, and barbed wire, the result was inconceivable bloodshed. To 
break the bloody stalemate on the Western Front, the Germans employed the so-called 
Storm Troops. The groups of around seven men—specially trained and heavily armed—
were too a small target for enemy artillery yet capable of stealthy infiltration of enemy lines 
and knocking out defensive strongpoints.44 And although the Storm Troops did not 
produce the strategic breakthrough, they indeed proved their tactical relevance. During the 
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Malayan campaign in 1941–42 that led to the fall of Singapore and a decisive Japanese 
victory, general Tomoyuki Yamashita divided his 25th Army into small elements that 
completely overwhelmed the British Commonwealth units.45  
During the Cold War, irregular warfare became even more prolific. After the 
invention of thermonuclear weapons reduced the likelihood of an all-out war between the 
great powers, “limited war” became a viable policy option.46 Even the most powerful 
actors recognized its effectiveness. Despite the immensely destructive power of 
their militaries, both the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan 
were defeated by their irregular enemies. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Russians 
repeated the bitter experience in Chechnya. And as the Global War on Terror goes on, 
Americans and their NATO allies still face seemingly elusive enemies in Afghanistan and 
the Middle East.  
Historically, an irregular warfare approach proved its effectiveness regardless of 
what actor used it. Irregular warfare’s peculiarities, like small unit actions, decentralized 
command and control (C2), hit-and-run tactics, or information dominance, are still the 
same as they were in the past. However, to make irregular warfare effective, its concept 
must be continuously adapted to the ever-changing operational environment and 
technology advancement.  
Irregular warfare is generally related to the notion of partisans attacking from 
remote areas who after a lightning action disappear into the countryside where they take 
advantage of the local populace’s support and intimate knowledge of the terrain. This was 
indeed true when much of the population lived in rural areas. This, however, does not hold 
up anymore. One of the distinct characteristics of the twenty-first-century world is the mass 
population shift from rural to urban areas. Irregular forces thus must be able to operate in 
a heavily urbanized environment lest they lose contact with the populace. Moreover, 
irregulars must cope with several technological breakthroughs chiefly in the area of 
surveillance and population control that may considerably hinder irregular forces’ 
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clandestine operations.47 Let us link this with the current advancement in military 
technology that enables modern militaries to survey vast areas of territory, collect and 
evaluate a tremendous amount of information, cut off or track communication, strike at 
long range, and rapidly deploy their forces, and we get an environment potentially fatal to 
any opposition.  
In Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, Australian 
strategist and counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen speaks about megatrends that are 
shaping the future of conflicts. According to Kilcullen, “These are population growth (the 
continuing rise in the planet’s total population), urbanization (the tendency for people to 
live in larger and larger cities), littoralization (the propensity for these cities to cluster in 
coastlines), and connectedness (the increasing connectivity among people, wherever they 
live).”48 Of course, these factors affect individual regions of the world differently, may not 
occur simultaneously or may not be relevant at all. However, some of them or their 
combination will have a pivotal effect on operations of military forces, regular as well as 
irregular. At first glance, the combination of new technologies and rapidly changing 
environment may be considered highly detrimental to operations and activities of irregular 
forces. But, as we will see later, this new world also offers various opportunities on how to 
turn these trends even against a powerful invader.   
E. IRREGULAR WARFARE AS A STRATEGIC APPROACH 
In pursuit of security, states invest in their military capabilities to enhance their 
deterrence policy “that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military 
retaliation, that the costs of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh 
the benefits.”49 For obvious reasons, however, small-state militaries cannot pose a credible 
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conventional deterrence against a great power’s aggression and if deterrence fails, their 
chances to repel a superior assailant are considerably limited. Thus, a small country’s 
military must base its defense plans differently than on a direct force-on-force approach. 
In his acclaimed book Strategy, Captain Basil H. Liddell Hart writes that “in most 
campaigns the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance has been the 
vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow.”50 This dislocation, as Liddell Hart 
asserts, can be achieved by a strategic indirect approach. The value of the strategy of 
indirect approach lies in not moving “along the line of natural expectation” because it 
“consolidates the opponent’s balance and thus increases his resisting power.”51   
The initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom resulted in a decisive military victory 
by the U.S.-led coalition over the Iraqi Armed Forces. According to the 2015 RAND 
analysis of the Iraq War, the combat performance of the Iraqis was generally very poor and 
ineffective due to ill-planned defense, incompetent leadership, inadequate training, and 
inferior weaponry.52 Conversely, the coalition dominated the battlefield due to the 
combination of superior military technology, effective battle plan, and highly trained and 
motivated troops.53 Indeed, the disparity in the warfighting capabilities of the belligerents 
was considerable. However, the Iraqi prospects were also undermined by the direct force-
on-force approach chosen by Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi forces were ordered to defend 
forward, outside the urban areas and block the coalition advance toward Baghdad and other 
major cities.54 This battle plan made the tactically inferior Iraqi troops, lacking 
sophisticated weaponry and without any relevant air-cover, even more vulnerable to 
coalition forces which enjoyed total air supremacy. The Iraqi direct approach thus led only 
to the piecemeal destruction of Iraqi ground forces.  
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The decision to take a direct stand against the enemy proved to be disastrous even 
for the most determined and relatively well-equipped Iraqi units. General Al-Hamdani, the 
Republican Guard II Corps commander, described the largest Iraqi counterattack that 
occurred in front of Baghdad as follows: 
The enemy used enormous firepower. It looked like napalm. Rocket 
launchers would fire groups of rockets, about 12 rockets each, that would 
explode in the air, burning whatever it faces on its way with flames. . . . 
The battle that took place didn’t look even like action movies, because events 
were so fast. I didn’t have a single tank intact; it was either damaged or 
destroyed. I didn’t have a single vehicle left. The battle reached a point where 
the army commander [myself] was fighting with a machine gun. The groups 
of command and communication were completely destroyed. . . . 
From the dawn . . . until sunset, the Air Force destroyed anything that moved. 
Then the Americans broke through fiercely, as if it was programmed. 
Anything that moved was hit by tanks, armored vehicles, Apaches, and jet 
fighters, whether it was civilian or military, Republican Guard or not . . . The 
amount of fire and destruction was beyond description.55  
The objective of the operation was to repel the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division on its final 
advance toward Baghdad when it was the most vulnerable—during the crossing of the 
Euphrates River.56 To prevent the Americans from taking the bridgehead, the Iraqis 
deployed the elements of two Republican Guard’s divisions (Medina and Nebuchadnezzar) 
and the  Special Forces 3rd Brigade with considerable artillery support.57 During the battle 
that took place from April 2–4, the U.S. forces experienced intensive enemy infantry and 
armored attacks, and heavy artillery fire. However, the artillery fire proved to be ineffective 
as it lost accuracy when the Americans simply repositioned their forces.58 Iraqi tank forces 
also suffered heavily due to the technological superiority of American Abrams tanks and 
Bradley infantry fighting vehicles which allowed crews to locate and engage Iraqi vehicles 
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in advance.59 Not to mention the deadly combination of the U.S. artillery fire and air power 
that kept the Iraqi forces under constant pressure. The battle resulted in another decisive 
American victory. The Iraqis lost over 30 T-72 tanks, approximately 50 BMP infantry 
fighting vehicles, and some 600 men against six to eight wounded Americans.60  
Indeed, against highly trained U.S. troops equipped with state-of-the-art 
technology, the Iraqis faced grim prospects. However, as the authors of the RAND study 
note, the Iraqi high command failed to exploit defensive options that could have made the 
coalition victory much more costly. Timely and pre-planned destruction of critical 
infrastructure and resolute defense of important choke points along the coalition lines of 
communication (LOCs) could have hindered the enemy’s advance.61 Most important, the 
Iraqis could have offset their warfighting deficiencies and limited the coalition tactical 
superiority had they lured the Allies to fight hardened defense positions in urban areas and 
major cities.62 This irregular warfare approach, combined with intensive propaganda to 
degrade the domestic support in the U.S. and other allied countries, may have caused the 
dislocation of enemy’s physical and psychological balance and given the Iraqis a better 
chance to oppose the superior assailant.  
This was just what the coalition forces began experiencing one year into Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. After several civilian contractors were killed and their corpses mutilated in 
an ambush in the city of Fallujah on March 31, 2004, the U.S. political leadership, despite 
the protests of the on-scene commanders, opted for a strong military response and ordered 
the U.S. military to storm the city.63 The attack began on April 4 when two battalions of 
U.S. Marines commenced Operation Vigilant Resolve. The initial scant intelligence 
estimated the presence of 600–2,000 insurgents, supported by approximately 1,000 
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locals.64 Thus the Marines, later reinforced by another two battalions, were to fight a 
resolved enemy which had the advantage of close knowledge of the battlefield. The battle 
was tough and destructive. U.S. troops encountered fanatical resistance. However, despite 
their often-suicidal actions and attempts to kill as many Americans as possible before being 
killed, the insurgents, armed with small arms, grenades, and rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPGs), had no chance to defeat the U.S. forces. As a non-professional armed force, they 
fought in small, uncoordinated units lacking formal C2. A retired four-star general and 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, whose 1st Marine Division played a key 
role in combat operations in Fallujah, understood the insurgents’ tactics. 
They had no formal, hierarchical military structure, with a commander and 
sub-commanders. Rather, they were gangs organized around mosques, 
neighborhoods, and local leaders. Knowing the streets and alleys as they did, 
they were able to engage in a running battle, but not a mutually supporting, 
coordinated fight. They could bloody us, but they could not hold out against 
the Marine assault.65 
However, the U.S. warfighting skills turned out to be beside the point. The heavy 
damage to civilian property and city infrastructure along with unavoidable losses of non-
combatants’ lives, which is unfortunately an inherent part of urban warfare, significantly 
affected U.S. actions during the battle and allowed the insurgents to strike back in the field 
of propaganda. Without facing any effective U.S. counterpropaganda, the insurgents 
publicized exaggerated images of the U.S. Marines as the raiders indifferently killing 
civilians and razing the city to the ground.66 The increasing cost in human lives and the 
destruction of the city caused international uproar and concerns of Iraqi officials. This 
pressure eventually broke the U.S. political leadership’s will to pursue the battle and forced 
it to prematurely suspend the operation. In the words of Mattis, the Americans “had lost 
the information war.”67 Operation Vigilant Resolve brought inconclusive results at the cost 
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of 36 U.S. troops killed in action, 200 insurgents killed and approximately 600 Iraqi civilian 
deaths.68  
More than a decade of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Iraq 
showed that even a coalition of the world’s most powerful militaries led by a global 
superpower experiences harsh times when confronted by an enemy skilled in irregular 
warfare. Years of bitter fighting against a cunning and adaptable enemy had claimed a 
heavy cost upon the coalition in terms of lives, financial and material resources, and 
damaged their international reputation. The Americans and their allies did not lose any 
significant encounter with the enemy. Yet their campaigns did bring inconclusive results 
that indeed cannot be called victory. As far as the insurgent forces are concerned, they were 
responsible for many despicable crimes committed against innocent civilians and those 
who refused to join their ranks. Terror, torture, and indiscriminate killing were an inherent 
part of their operations. However, from the strategy perspective, they were often highly 
efficient. During the second battle of Fallujah (Operation Phantom Fury/Al-Fajr), fought 
out in November and December 2004, the insurgent forces did not pose a first-class fighting 
force. They lacked effective C2 of their forces, lacked armored capabilities, air defense, 
EW capabilities, etc.69 However, as the authors of the comprehensive RAND study on 
urban warfare conclude:  
Still, the actual enemy in Fallujah did present some tough tactical problems. 
A good portion of the enemy forces were competent in individual light 
infantry fighting techniques and the use of small arms, light mortars, and 
RPGs. Collectively, they could come together in small groups to fight 
effectively using limited C2. And, significantly, the will and determination 
of many of these fighters reached the point of fanaticism. Combine these 
attributes with the fact that the insurgents knew the terrain of the city and its 
structure and used that knowledge to build effective individual building 
defenses and ambush points outside of them on the streets, and one finds a 
formidable enemy force.70 
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These conclusions thus raise the question of how costly may have been the initial 
coalition military victory had the Iraqi forces, possessing hundreds of tanks, artillery 
pieces, anti-tank weapons, and man-portable-air-defense systems (MANPADS), chosen an 
indirect irregular warfare approach and prepared their defense in cities and urban areas.  
The famous Prussian/German Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke (also known 
as Moltke the Elder) stated that strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical 
victory.71 This is, however, not necessarily a precondition for a successful irregular 
warfare campaign. Successful irregular warfare strategy does not presuppose a military 
victory over enemy forces. As John Arquilla points out, “a victorious outcome alone cannot 
be the measure of mastery in irregular warfare.”72 And given the blatant disequilibrium 
that often preponderates between belligerents in asymmetric conflicts, it would be a foolish 
goal. Tactical victories are thus not necessary to strategically defeat a superior enemy. Or 
as framed by one of the main irregular warfare principles, “if the tactics are wrong but the 
strategy is right, battles may be lost but the war will be won.”73  Hence, a small state’s 
meaningful defense plan in a war against a superior enemy should not be aimed at a 
conventional military victory but at breaking his will to fight. A deliberately pre-planned 
irregular warfare campaign, indirect by its very nature, led by well-trained and well-
equipped forces has the power to physically and psychologically dislocate the enemy and 
thus significantly increase the underdog’s prospects to turn defeat into victory.74     
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III. WAGING AN IRREGULAR WARFARE CAMPAIGN 
The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and 
death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which 
can on no account be neglected.       
              —Sun-Tzu 
War is one of the most complex and demanding of human activities. To prevail on 
the battlefield and to subdue the enemy, conventional military commanders employ joint 
functions to integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Although their portfolio of 
capabilities and activities was usually much smaller than that of their stronger conventional 
opponents, the masters of irregular warfare also had to integrate, synchronize, and direct 
operations of forces under their command. Often under desperate conditions, facing a 
seemingly invincible enemy and suffering heavy losses, to succeed, irregular force 
commanders had to retain cohesion of their forces, command them, and maneuver with 
them to avoid a superior firepower and to strike at the less presumable place. They deceived 
their enemies on the battlefield, subverted the domestic support in their adversaries’ home 
countries, and gained valuable intelligence that helped them to offset their conventional 
weakness. And as with every successful military leader in history, the masterminds of 
irregular warfare had to sustain their forces, keep their supplies running, and protect their 
ranks from infiltration and their operations from compromise.  
Over the next pages, various aspects related to command and control, information, 
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment are described 
with respect to the distinctive features of irregular warfare. As Joint Publication 3-0, Joint 
Operations, clearly states, joint functions reinforce and complement one other.75 They are 
interrelated. Thus, it is evident that, for example, C2 of forces must reflect their structure, 
what at the same time bears on maneuver and movement as well as employment of fires. 
These factors affect every military regardless of its structure, size or equipment. Irregular 
forces, which tend to operate in small dispersed teams with limited firepower and 
protection, require more decentralized C2 that reflects their decentralized organization. So, 
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although his solutions may be different, it is obvious that a commander of irregular forces 
must deal with the same challenges as his conventional counterpart.  
The way how this research describes the specifics of irregular warfare campaign 
exceeds the operational level of warfare. Conventional military JFC, as the operational 
level commander, “links the tactical employment of forces to national strategic 
objectives.”76 As previously mentioned, a conventional military commander employs joint 
functions to integrate, synchronize, and direct the operations of forces under his or her 
command, without being concerned with strategic issues like how to structure a nation’s 
military or what kind of steps must be done at the strategic national or military level to 
create a combat-ready force. However, to introduce the value of irregular warfare as a 
strategic approach for a small-state military, remarks and recommendations that touch 
on strategic issues and challenges are also presented. Those are the challenges that must 
be tackled to create a national fighting force capable of waging an effective irregular 
warfare campaign.  
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
His Majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when 
not to obey his orders. 
              —Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia77 
According to Joint Publication 3-0, the C2 function “is commander-centric and 
network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decision making at the lowest appropriate 
level.”78 C2 encompasses various tasks, including establishing, organizing, and operating 
force headquarters (HQ), commanding subordinate units, preparing and modifying plans 
and orders, disseminating them to subordinate units, managing risk, and synchronizing, 
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coordinating and controlling employment of capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal 
effects, and ensuring unity of effort towards operational and strategic objectives.79  
C2 is about the exertion of a commander’s authority over assigned and attached 
forces which he directs to achieve mission end-states.80 Modern warfare depends on a 
robust and resilient integrated C2 system. C2, a complex set of facilities, equipment, 
communications, procedures, and personnel essential for a commander to plan, direct, and 
control operations, is, however, a primary target of enemy actions.81 The reason for 
targeting the adversary’s C2 system is obvious. The side which denies the enemy’s ability 
to exert C2 over its forces gains a decisive advantage because, as Liddell Hart argues, “a 
decision is produced even more by the mental and moral dislocation of the command than 
by the physical dislocation of its forces.”82  
Disruption of enemy C2 has ever been an important part of military strategy. In the 
battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.), fought out between Sparta and the army of Thebes, the Spartan 
command was the decisive point against which Epaminondas, the Theban general, massed 
the bulk of his forces. In a brilliant maneuver called the “oblique order” (made famous over 
2,100 years later by another great military leader, the Prussian king Frederick II the Great), 
Epaminondas crushed the Spartan right wing—the wing where the king Cleombrotus I 
stood—and decisively won the battle.83  
The importance of a commander’s person was also manifested during the battle of 
Hastings (1066) between the Norman-French forces of William the Conqueror and the 
Anglo-Saxon army of King Harold. During the battle, first the rumor of William’s death 
threatened the cohesion of the Norman forces. However, William managed to retain the 
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morale of his troops when he took off his helmet and showed himself to his soldiers.84 
Conversely, the death of King Harold—he was struck in his eye by an arrow and 
subsequently killed—had a profound effect on his forces since without command they 
became disorganized and were finally defeated.85  
Attempts to dislocate enemy C2 structures are also not rare in the era of modern 
warfare. World War II provides two examples, the failed British attempt to kill German 
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the successful U.S. Operation Vengeance which resulted 
in killing Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.86 Targeted killing has also been 
extensively employed during the Global War on Terror. Whether carried out by highly 
trained special operations commandos or by unmanned aerial vehicles armed with 
precision ammunition, the physical elimination of enemy leadership is still an important 
part of military strategy. For an irregular force command, inherently weaker than its 
conventional opponents, it follows the need to decentralize its structures and alleviate the 
consequences of the adversary’s decapitation policy.  
Decentralized C2 was an inherent part of the successful Yugoslav irregular warfare 
campaign led by Josip Broz “Tito” during the Second World War. Yugoslavia, occupied 
by Germans after a swift and decisive invasion in April 1941, soon became a place of 
determined resistance against the invaders. At the beginning of the occupation, the bulk of 
the country’s resistance was represented by the communist guerrilla force of approximately 
fifteen thousand fighters commanded by Tito.87 In the following years, Tito’s C2 over his 
forces had to withstand considerable challenges. Besides ongoing disputes and occasional 
clashes with the troops of another guerrilla movement, the Chetniks led by a Serb general 
Dragoljub “Draga” Mihailovich, Tito’s guerrillas had to cope with several large-scale 
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German counter-guerrilla operations and the ever-present threat of traitors and 
collaborators.  
Indeed, the partisans suffered heavily at the hands of a formidable enemy. To crush 
the insurgency, the Germans employed the tactics of encirclement combined with inserting 
the Jagdkommandos (specialized hunting teams) into the area of operation to push the 
insurgents toward the line of the outer cordon.88 Yet the heavy strain posed by immense 
casualties and constant evasion of kill or capture did not compel Tito and his fighters to 
give up.  
The lasting threat posed by Tito, throughout the war enjoying increasing British 
material support, forced Hitler to commit ever more forces to hunt down the partisans. In 
1943 Hitler, fearing an Allied landing in Greece, told Goebbels, his propaganda minister, 
that seventeen divisions were deployed to the Balkans.89 The effectiveness of Tito’s 
fighters no doubt augmented Hitler’s fears. Noteworthy is the remark in the diary of field 
marshal Maximilian von Weichs, Hitler’s commander-in-chief in the Balkans: 
Not that you can speak of “partisans” anymore—under Tito a powerful 
Bolshevik army has arisen, moving from strength to strength and growing 
more deadly every day. It has strong British support. The incompetence of 
the Croatian government [under Pavelić] is an increasing menace. Should 
the enemy invade Dalmatia and Albania, we can expect general Communist 
uprisings to break out here.90    
These concerns were not ill-founded. The collapse of Italy enabled the insurgents 
to seize a large enough number of weapons to equip a force of 200,000 warriors, extend 
their operations, and finally liberate the country without the direct assistance of foreign 
troops.91 
Yet Tito, despite his fine commanding skills, would not be able to succeed had he 
relied on solid, centralized C2 structures. The explanation is simple. Due to the 
shortcomings of his forces in numbers, equipment, and firepower, he had to, in the words 
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of John Arquilla, “packetize” his troops and disperse them across the mountainous 
country.92 Enforced relocations of his command posts also made any attempt to retain 
constant control over his forces impossible. These factors made the decentralization of 
Tito’s C2 vitally important and necessary. However, the more decentralized command, the 
higher is the demand for skillful local commanders capable of operating with a lack of 
orders and instructions. Tito had them. His best men like Djilas, Kardelj, Ribar, and 
Popovic were reliable leaders operating in accordance with Tito’s general intent and 
campaign objectives.93 Their decentralized C2 enabled Tito’s partisans to evade German 
counter-guerrilla operations, withstand heavy losses, and yet remain capable of conducting 
coordinated operations across the country.94  
The citation at the beginning of this section refers to von Moltke’s favorite story of 
an incident between Prince Frederick Charles, an influential figure in Prussian military 
history and von Moltke’s contemporary, and one major responsible for a wrong tactical 
decision.95 After the major tried to defend himself by emphasizing his obedience to the 
orders, Prince Frederick Charles’ prompt response made it clear—unquestioning obedience 
does not make a commander a good commander.96 Prince’s reaction was absolutely in 
accord with Moltke’s ideas of the local commanders’ widest freedom of action possible so 
long as they act with a supreme commander’s overall intent.97 Moltke stressed the 
importance of commanding through directives rather than detailed orders because, as he 
believed: 
No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with 
the enemy’s main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign 
a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept 
pursued consistently to the end. Certainly the commander in chief (Feldherr) 
will keep his great objective (Zweck) continuously in mind, undisturbed by 
the vicissitudes of events. But the path on which he hopes to reach it can 
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never be firmly established in advance. Throughout the campaign he must 
make a series of decisions on the basis of situations that cannot be foreseen. 
The successive acts of the war are thus not premeditated designs, but on the 
contrary are spontaneous acts guided by military measures.98 
Moltke’s thoughts express the essence of the Auftragstaktik, literally “mission 
tactics,” the Prussian doctrinal view according to which “the subordinate commander is 
responsible for endeavoring at all times to carry out the mission concept of his superior, 
whether he has orders or not, or whether his latest orders apply to a changing situation.”99 
Auftragstaktik became an inseparable part of the Prussian and subsequently German officer 
and non-commissioned officer training and education that preferred initiative and 
imagination over buck-passing waiting for instructions and rigid adherence to orders.  
The C2 of irregular forces, due to their need to operate in small and dispersed 
groups decentralized by nature, relies heavily on competent commanders at all levels. The 
concept of swarming (more closely introduced in the “Movement and Maneuver” section), 
increasing the pressure on an enemy by hitting him in multiple places at the same time, can 
work only if small-unit commanders are given enough freedom of action to react to a 
rapidly changing combat situation.100 Moreover, without decentralized C2 and reliable 
unit commanders, it is impossible to meet the two fundamental requirements of 
swarming—communication and coordination across the swarm force; and ISR performed 
by each unit to support the situational awareness of the higher level of command.101 Of 
course, communication and coordination, as well as information sharing in modern 
warfare, also depends on technological means. However, without capable and well-trained 
soldiers and commanders even the best technology can be to no avail. Conversely, well-
trained forces led by competent leaders can hold out even against overwhelming odds as it 
became evident during the Russo-Chechen wars. 
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The roots of Russo-Chechen animosity date to the mid-1500s when Ivan the 
Terrible defeated the Astrakhan and Kazan Khanates and won for Russia the control over 
the regions of today’s Chechnya and Dagestan.102 Since then, Russia has tried to 
consolidate its position in this strategically important area. However, Russian rule in the 
region has never been fully accepted by the local populace which has brought about 
centuries of war, conflict, and violence. And because of Russian military superiority, the 
prevalent form of fighting on the Chechen side has ever been irregular warfare. It was not 
otherwise in the last major conflicts—the First (1994-1996) and Second (1999-2000) 
Chechen Wars.  
Combat operations of the Russo-Chechen Wars were waged both in cities and in 
rural areas and mountains, but the most destructive battles took place in urban areas. Many 
cities, including the capital of Grozny, were literally razed to the ground. When the Russian 
forces entered Grozny in December 1994, they immediately encountered coordinated 
attacks of small teams of Chechen fighters armed mainly with small arms, RPGs, grenades, 
and Molotov cocktails.103 By luring the Russians into the city, the rebels alleviated the 
numerical and technological superiority of their opponents. Simultaneous lightning attacks 
from multiple positions significantly hampered the ability of enemy gunners to acquire 
targets.104 The swarming tactics thus increased the security of Chechen forces when, for 
example, their positions became compromised by the RPG’s signature backblast.105 
However, this highly decentralized warfare to a large extent depends on the individual 
soldier’s warfighting skills, independent thought, and actions of commanders at all levels, 
and avoiding exorbitant adherence to standardized procedures.106 This, of course, applies 
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to combat in every environment. However, in the case of urban warfare, the need for 
tactical decentralization, and initiative and freedom of action is yet more obvious because, 
as Kilcullen points out, “cities disaggregate combat—reducing even large battles to a series 
of small, fleeting, and short-range engagement.”107 The Chechen solved this “partition” of 
combat by dividing the city into sectors of responsibility, assigned to 75-men groups (each 
group comprised 3 25-man subgroups capable of splitting into even smaller six- or seven-
man formations).108 The unit commanders were granted a great deal of freedom of 
command and were not bounded with strict orders from higher up. These lightly armed and 
highly mobile forces, led by the adherents of the principle “less centralization, more 
coordination,” inflicted heavy casualties on the Russian forces in Grozny.109  Of course, 
the battle took a heavy toll on the Chechens, too. After they lost thousands of fighters, the 
Chechen commanders finally decided to give up the city and pull back. However, it was 
the combination of a multitude of small teams swarming the enemy, highly decentralized 
C2, and competent commanders able to utilize the tactical freedom of action to the 
maximum extent, which made the Chechens such a formidable foe.  
In the first Russo-Chechen War, the poor state of the Russian military was fully 
exposed. During the battle of Grozny, Russian forces, once a premier urban warfare 
fighting force because of the hard-earned lessons of the Second World War, took heavy 
casualties due to lack of intelligence, insufficient coordination at all levels of command, 
low supplies, poor training of the troops, and incompetence of their commanders.110 
During the catastrophic New Year’s assault on Grozny, almost everything went wrong. 
The Russian command decided to take the city by an all-out assault of several armored 
columns. The assault was preceded by artillery bombardment and airstrikes, the 
effectiveness of which, however, was very limited due to bad weather.111 The course of 
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the battle can be described through the story of the 131st Motor Rifle Brigade which was 
a part of the Russian assault package. After moving into the city, the brigade soon 
encountered fierce opposition from the Chechen fighters who set up a trap. In just an hour, 
swarming enemy attacks from all directions knocked out thirteen tanks and armored 
personnel carriers.112 In the subsequent inferno, the brigade lost 20 tanks (out of 26), all 6 
self-propelled antiaircraft guns, and 102 other armored vehicles (only 18 of them made it 
back to the Russian lines). The human losses are difficult to estimate; however, the brigade, 
446 troops strong before the assault, lost its commander, Colonel Ivan Savin, 74 soldiers 
were taken prisoners of war, and in February, 120 were still missing in action.113 The initial 
debacle forced the Russians to change tactics. Ineffective assaults of bulky formations were 
replaced by actions of smaller units moving forward from building to building.114 Massive 
reinforcements of troops, weapons, and equipment from across Russia also began 
arriving.115 These factors, along with improved planning and execution of operations, 
finally forced the Chechen High Command to abandon the city and evacuate its forces in 
February 1995.  
Battles and operations of the Second Chechen War showed improved Russian 
combat performance in terms of better C2, coordination, supplies, battle tactics, and 
employment of fires. After taking heavy losses of armor inflicted by the Chechen swarms, 
the Russian forces soon learned how to tackle the main Chechen antitank weapon—the 
RPG. The Russians employed stayed out of its maximum range, employed artillery and 
aerial attacks, and assaulted only after the preparatory bombardment.116 Russians also 
created special EW units to track Chechen communications so they could be either jammed 
or tracked to its source.117 Indeed, enhanced Russian EW operations posed a significant 
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problem to the Chechen rebels. They could either risk insecure communication or resort to 
personal meetings to get orders and supplies. One or the other, however, made them highly 
vulnerable to Russian search-and-destroy operations conducted to cut off Chechen supply 
lines, and destroy isolated units.118 Under such harsh conditions, and with mounting losses 
and a critical shortage of weapons, ammunition, and equipment, the need for high-quality 
leaders became yet more important. As one of the Chechen field commanders emphasized, 
his duty was not only to lead his men into battle but also to be “responsible for arming, 
supplying and feeding my men. A hungry soldier isn’t a soldier at all.”119   
The example of Chechen resistance against Russians shows the critical importance 
of competent leadership enjoying a high degree of tactical freedom of action for an irregular 
warfare campaign. Of course, able leaders, granted sufficient authority to act, are the 
prerequisite of every successful military operation. However, given the essence of irregular 
warfare—the small unit operations often conducted under extremely difficult conditions 
against a superior enemy—skilled commanders even at the lowest tactical level are 
necessary. Their importance, however critical at the beginning of the conflict, becomes 
even more obvious when mounting losses threatens troop cohesion. Without them, the 
continuation of fighting is almost impossible since the veterans’ combat experience, 
knowledge, and leadership skills are critical for retaining the cohesion of units. Dodge 
Billingsley, a long-time analyst and observer of many conflicts, including the Iraq War and 
conflict in Afghanistan, wrote about the Chechen rebels: 
The Chechen force was as good as its platoon- and company-sized unit 
leadership. In the Chechen forces these sized units were normally well 
organized and well led. Most often they were also grandly designated as 
battalions. Multi-battalion and front commanders led through force of 
personality and reputation.120 
These remarks are indeed important because of another reason. Due to the general 
decentralized mode of operations behind enemy lines, the credibility of irregular force 
commanders must rely more on their men’s respect than upon formal enforcement of 
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discipline because, as a Swiss military theorist Hans von Dach argued, “behind enemy 
lines, no military policeman, no military court, nor any state power will help the guerrilla 
leader to maintain discipline and fighting spirit.”121 Therefore, Billingsley’s observations 
only confirm the general principle of “leading by example,” so often emphasized in 
military leadership courses.  
B. INFORMATION 
The weaker the forces that are at the disposal of the supreme commander, 
the more appealing the use of cunning becomes.   
                        —Karl von Clausewitz122 
 
The information function, according to Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 
“encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration 
with other joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements 
that drive desired behaviors and to support human and automated decision making.”123 
Within their information management responsibilities, commanders must ensure 
appropriate friendly information and data protection. They ensure meaningful intelligence 
and information sharing to keep necessary situational awareness and shared understanding 
across the joint force as well as the creation of a collaborative environment that promotes 
efficient use of information.124 The goal is to use information to create favorable 
conditions for the execution of friendly forces’ operations.  
Information is no doubt the most precious asset. Timely acquired information is 
often critical in many aspects of civilian life, let alone in wartime. However, equally 
important is to deny an opponent access to information and/or to slip him information that 
would influence or alter his actions in a way favorable to the friendly mission. This is the 
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essence of military deception (MILDEC).125 Deception, ubiquitous in nature, has been an 
inherent part of warfare since ancient times. Deception targets the enemy to distort his 
perception of reality. Therefore, as Jon Latimer underscores, “deception must always be 
aimed at the mind of the enemy commander, at the man who makes the decisions, whether 
it be the head of state of a country or an ordinary soldier.”126 Deception, as Latimer notes, 
manipulates an adversary’s perceptions by identifying a bias or creating one, if 
necessary.127 Subsequently, an adversary’s perceptions are reinforced through 
information—true, false, partially true or misleading—to induce the adversary’s favorable 
reaction.128 As such, deception can be employed against foreign political leaders as well 
as at all levels of warfare.  
Deception was an inherent part of Hitler’s policy to restore German political and 
military power in the 1930s. To achieve his foreign policy goals, the leader of Nazi 
Germany reinforced the Western powers’ fear of a new European war by a subtle 
application of diplomacy supported by real and fictive capabilities of the Wehrmacht. The 
most obvious it was in the case of the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force. In March 1935, 
fully aware of Germany’s military inferiority towards France and Britain and fearful of the 
possibility of their intervention, Hitler announced the creation of the Luftwaffe. It was 
Hitler’s version of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s “risk theory” which before 1914 
presupposed that a certain level of German naval power would convince the British not to 
engage the Germans; in Hitler’s case, the destructive—yet non-existent—power of the new 
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arm would theoretically dissuade the West from intervening against Germany and later 
bolster Hitler’s threats.129     
Deception at all levels of warfare was extensively applied during the largest 
military conflict in human history. Operation Barclay, a successful Allied deception 
campaign in support of Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, deceived the 
Germans at the strategic level. The operation aimed to reinforce Hitler’s fears of the Allies 
invading Europe through the Balkans. To do so, the Allies initiated a comprehensive 
deception plan consisting of a fake military build-up, deceptive radio transmissions, 
dummy amphibious crafts protected by real anti-aircraft units, and genuine logistic 
support.130 To bolster the overall deception, the British intelligence executed Operation 
Mincemeat, one of the most famous deception operations in history. The Brits secured a 
corpse of a recently deceased man, provided him with a fake identity and a briefcase 
containing fabricated documents, and released it close to the Spanish coast to simulate an 
air-crash and death of a British officer transferring classified documents.131 After the body 
was recovered, the briefcase was finally passed to the German High Command. The 
documents strengthened Hitler’s beliefs that the main target was the Balkans. The Allied 
deception plan, fully exploiting Hitler’s obsession with the Balkans, scored absolute 
success as the Germans significantly increased their military presence in Greece at the 
expense of Sicily where the Allied forces achieved total strategic surprise.132 
In spring 1944, Stavka—the Soviet High Command—considered several strategic 
options for the summer offensive. The final approved campaign plan against the German 
Army Group Center, under the code name Operation Bagration, called for a massive 
relocation of forces and supplies. To hide the redeployment of more than 400,000 men, 
3,000 tanks, 10,000 artillery pieces, and hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies, the 
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Soviets employed extensive maskirovka at the strategic and operational level.133 The 
skillfully elaborated Red Army deception plan in support of Operation Bagration 
capitalized on the years of wartime experience finally codified in the 1944 Field Regulation 
which described maskirovka as follows: 
Maskirovka is a mandatory form of combat support for each action and 
operation. The objectives of maskirovka are to secure concealment to the 
manoeuvre and concentration of troops for the purpose of delivering a 
surprise attack; to mislead the enemy relative to our forces, weapons, actions 
and intentions; and thus force him to make an incorrect decision.134 
The direction of the offensive completely surprised the Germans. When the 
operation began on June 22 (the third anniversary of Operation Barbarossa), the Soviet 
steamroller of more than 1,250,000 men, 4,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, supported 
by 24,000 artillery pieces and 6,000 planes, smashed 25 to 28 German divisions, 350,000 
men total, and opened for the Soviets the way into Poland and Lithuania.135  
At the tactical level, the war saw an extensive usage of camouflage uniforms, 
increased importance of radio discipline, employment of decoys and dummies of all kinds, 
intensive use of smoke to conceal troop movement, and utilization of artificial and natural 
materials to conceal positions or to create false ones to compel the enemy to squander his 
resources for useless artillery or aerial bombardment. This is just what happened during 
the final Soviet advance to Berlin in April 1945. General Gotthard Heinrici, whose Army 
Group Vistula defended Berlin, ordered to be built a complex defensive system consisting 
of three mutually supportive main lines at elevated plateau known as Seelow Heights, 
approximately 90 kilometers east of Berlin.136 Heinrici planned to withdraw his men from 
the first line of trenches just before the anticipated Soviet preparatory bombardment. On 
April 16, the initial day of the Berlin operation, the preparatory artillery and aerial barrage 
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was unleashed against the heavily outnumbered German forces. However, the barrage of 
9,000 guns was to a large extent ineffective because, as the commander of the Soviet 3rd 
Shock Army Colonel General Vasily Kuznetsov recalled, the Germans “… pulled back 
their troops a good eight kilometers. Our artillery hit everything but the enemy.”137  
As some of the many examples of the Second World War indicate, deception is a 
powerful tool. However, as Michael I. Handel noted,  
Unfortunately deception is a creative art and not an exact science or even a 
craft. For that reason it is difficult to teach someone how to deceive unless 
he has a natural instinct for it. This explains why, despite the large number 
of war memoirs and detailed military histories which discuss deception, little 
has been written on the theory of deception or how to practice it. It is 
normally assumed that some military or political leaders are “deception-
minded” while others are not. There is probably no systematic, structured 
way to teach the art of deception, as it is impossible to teach someone to 
become an original painter. Perhaps the only way to learn the art of deception 
is through one’s own experience.138 
And when the talent is cultivated through persistent practice, deception can be 
exceptionally fruitful even at the lowest tactical level. During the German invasion of 
Yugoslavia in April 1941, the capital of Belgrade was taken because of the swift 
independent action of one cunning officer and his small team. During the Yugoslav 
campaign, SS-Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Fritz Klingenberg and his company from the SS 
Division Das Reich were operating as a divisional reconnaissance unit. On April 11, 
Klingenberg was tasked to reconnoiter the access routes towards Belgrade, secure them, 
and await reinforcements.139 However, after realizing that the main bridges had been 
destroyed by retreating Yugoslav troops and the main routes soaked and inappropriate for 
tank movement, Klingenberg exploited the chaos in the city resulting from previous aerial 
bombardment, crossed the Danube River, and seized the city on his own.140 In a 
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remarkable illustration of initiative, boldness, and deception, Klingenberg entered the city, 
raised the German flag, met the mayor of Belgrade and introduced himself as a commander 
of his division’s forward echelon, and requested the immediate surrender of the city. 
Otherwise, as Klingenberg blackmailed the mayor, the city would face total destruction by 
German artillery and airstrikes. After a one-hour talk, the mayor finally swallowed the ruse 
and rendered the city of more than 200,000 inhabitants, along with 1,300 Yugoslav troops, 
to Klingenberg and his handful of men.141 
This kind of “out-of-box” thinking is an inherent part of the Special Operations 
Force skillset. One of the most bizarre attempts to deceive the enemy is linked with the 1st 
Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, or Delta Force, the U.S. military’s Tier One 
Unit. In the late 1990s, Delta operators were deployed to Bosnia to hunt down Radovan 
Karadzic, the infamous Bosnian Serb politician accused of war crimes committed during 
the Bosnian War (1992–95). In one attempt to capture Karadzic, Delta set up an ambush 
on his convoy. To slow down the convoy enough to shoot the passing car with a special 
concussion grenade, the soldiers sent one man to walk along the road in a gorilla suit.142 
As one Delta operator recalled,  
The shock of seeing a freaking gorilla walking down the road, along with 
their uncontrollable curiosity to understand what the hell it’s doing in the 
middle of Bosnia, may just make them pause a couple more seconds, which 
ought to create the perfect conditions for us to fire the rounds and conduct 
the capture.143    
In all the aforementioned deception actions—strategic or tactical—the actors 
showed exceptional aptitude, wit, and talent for deception. However, their actions have 
another critical feature in common. Because the deceivers were relatively weaker or in a 
disadvantageous position to their opponents, they used deception, in the words of Liddell 
Hart, to physically and mentally imbalance the enemy. A confused enemy helped them to 
achieve surprise and eventually increase their security. Therefore, as the authors of one 
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RAND study on deception conclude, “deception is by itself an asymmetric approach to 
warfighting: tricking the opponent into misapplying his strengths and revealing his 
weaknesses.”144 It may be just the overall superiority of the Western militaries that made 
them especially after the Cold War so negligent about deception. However, what can be—
with possibly dangerous consequences—disregarded by the combined arms militaries of 
the great powers should not be omitted by small-state militaries, let alone by commanders 
of irregular forces. 
Operation Allied Force, the NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, started in March 1999 with the political objective to stop “all military actions, 
violence, and repression” in Kosovo, ensure the withdrawal of Serbian military personnel, 
police and paramilitary forces from the province, and pave the way for the presence of 
international peacekeeping forces.145 After 78 days of what then U.S. Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen called “the most precise application of airpower in history,” the Allied air 
power finally compelled Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, to back down.146 The 
Allied air campaign during the Kosovo War called for the execution of two simultaneous 
phases—the Phased Air Operation targeting Serbian integrated air defense system (IADS) 
and forces deployed to Kosovo; the Limited Air Operation ought to destroy Serbian C2 
and support structures in and around Kosovo.147 However, the deliberately pre-planned 
campaign did not unfold according to the plan.  
During the campaign, the force ratio and technology undoubtedly counted against 
the Serbs. However, at the operational level, the Allies encountered several setbacks. As 
RAND researcher Benjamin S. Lambeth points out, initial airstrikes to suppress enemy air 
defense (SEAD) were often difficult to execute due to the dispersion of enemy forces and 
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application of electronics security and emission control.148 Due to the inability to locate 
and destroy enemy surface-to-air missiles, NATO aircraft were forced to conduct bombing 
missions from high altitudes, which often hindered target acquisition.149 General Wesley 
Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the overall 
commander of NATO forces during the operation, recalled: 
After the first days of the air campaign . . . The results did not look good. In 
Phase I we had wanted to destroy or neutralize Milosevic’s air defense 
system. Our analysis showed that we were still short of our objectives in 
destroying his early warning system, taking out his surface-to-air missiles, 
disrupting his command and control, and taking down his radio relay and 
communication sites. Moreover, the Serbs still retained their surface-to-air 
missile capability, some airfield capability, and so on. Now we were moving 
to Phase II strikes against forces facilities and support, including lines of 
communications in southern Serbia, and to frustrate us here, all Milosevic 
had to do was disperse the Serb heavy weapons and headquarters, continue 
operations against the Kosovars, and avoid a NATO ground intervention. 
We had lost the element of surprise, so the results were disappointing in 
purely military terms.150 
The difficulties with the suppression of enemy air defense continued throughout the 
entire campaign. The fact that the Serbian mobile surface-to-air capability remained largely 
intact was confirmed by the Alliance itself when NATO officials conceded that only 3 out 
of approximately 25 SA-6 batteries—the most capable air defense system in Serbian 
inventory—had been confirmed destroyed.151 
The same problem arose with the Serbian ground forces which fully exploited the 
combination of bad weather, mountainous terrain, and zero presence of NATO troops on 
the ground to conceal their positions and avoid detection. Without fear of NATO ground 
intervention, the Serbian forces were not forced to maneuver and thus reveal their positions. 
Concealment of the main forces was enhanced by the skillful use of decoys. The Serbs used 
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tetra-paks to create dummy-tanks or wood-burning stoves with their chimneys positioned 
like artillery tubes.152 Extensive use of smoke was also used to reduce the effectiveness of 
laser-guided ordnance.153 According to some reports, water barrels were used to foil 
enemy aircraft’s infrared pods, emulating the infrared signature once the water heated 
up.154 As a result, out of approximately 300 Serbian tanks deployed to Kosovo, 93 tanks 
were hit out of which only 26 were completely destroyed.155   
During the campaign, NATO forces coped with several impediments. Due to 
political constraints, early warning radars in Montenegro remained operational during the 
war, allowing the Serbs to retain situational awareness about incoming NATO sorties.156 
With no boots on the ground, NATO pilots were deprived of crucial cooperation with 
forward air control elements that would have otherwise significantly enhanced the targeting 
process as well as the battle damage assessment (BDA). Moreover, the Serbs, who did not 
face any pressure on the ground, could simply refuse to fight and avoid detection.  
Despite the setbacks, Operation Allied Force finally achieved its goals. The NATO 
air war against Milosevic’s regime finally forced the Serbian president to comply with the 
demands of the international community, stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, withdraw his 
forces from the province, and let the international peacekeeping forces arrive. However, 
from the purely military perspective, the Serbian forces fully exploited the holes in the 
NATO war plan and through a skillful application of deception avoided destruction while 
remaining a constant threat to Allied aircraft.  
In an asymmetric conflict, the underdog’s ability to employ deception may draw a 
thin line between destruction and continuation in fighting. However, deception, like any 
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other military operation, must be operationally feasible (must be within the force 
capabilities) and sustainable (required resources must be available). For obvious reasons, 
in an asymmetric conflict, irregular forces represent the side that gets the short end of the 
stick. Enemy superiority in numbers, firepower including stand-off capabilities, and 
advanced ISR can be, however, significantly degraded in urban areas. Modern cities offer 
countless options on how to employ deception. Modern militaries’ interception capabilities 
are impressive indeed. Their ability to execute a kinetic strike once a target is acquired is 
unquestionable. However, as Kilcullen noted, “the capacity to intercept, tag, track and 
locate specific cellphone and Internet users from a drone already exists, but distinguishing 
signal from background noise in a densely connected, heavily trafficked piece of digital 
space is a hugely daunting challenge.”157 Cities have become the hubs of electronic smog; 
in other words, the density of information and communication technologies may hinder 
even the most technologically advanced foe from processing the profusion of information 
and identify actionable intelligence.158 Moreover, the complex environment of modern 
cities along with almost endless sources of materials of any sort, artificial and natural, can 
be utilized by a skillful deceiver in various ways, from concealing troops and positions or 
creating fake ones to overloading enemy sensors or spreading disinformation.159  
Technological advancement does not decrease the validity of deception. Identical 
examples of misleading an enemy can be found in various eras. During the First Chechen 
War, the Chechen fighters repeatedly applied the same deception tactics as the Germans 
50 years ago in front of Berlin. Facing overwhelming Russian stand-off firepower and 
limited by the range of RPGs as their only antitank weapon, the Chechens dug a series of 
trenches in the suburbs and waited for Russian preliminary bombardment.160 The 
Chechens sometimes booby-trapped or mined the forward positions before leaving them, 
hoping to lure the Russian infantry into a trap, and then reoccupied the trenches after the 
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bombardment, ready to engage advancing Russian armor.161 Disinformation operations 
also played a role in Chechen deception. The Chechens, many of them former Red Army 
soldiers, frequently overheard Russian radio communication (especially during the First 
Chechen War, Russian communication discipline and operations security [OPSEC] was 
very poor), and spread disinformation to lure the Russians into ambushes or confuse them 
about Chechen intentions.162 Russian forces employed similar ruses during the second 
battle of Grozny when they communicated fake messages via an intentionally unsecured 
line to convince the Chechens that a less defended corridor could be used to withdraw from 
the city.163 As a result, as they tried to break out of encircled Grozny, the Chechen forces 
walked into a minefield and in the following artillery and mortar fire of the alerted 
Russians, they took heavy casualties including several prominent commanders.164  
Throughout history, deception was often arrogantly ignored by the strong as the 
weapon of the weak. However, as James F. Dunnigan points out, what for the strong is an 
option, for the weak is a must.165 As a perfect example of an indirect approach, deception 
offers irregular forces a way of how to preserve their strength and fight the other day or to 
achieve surprise and relative superiority to strike the enemy unexpectedly in both physical 
and information domains. Whether political or at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels 
of war, deception can be a profoundly effective force multiplier, mission enhancer or 
strategic enabler.166 However, the ability to deceive is a highly perishable skill that 
requires constant training and perfection. Otherwise, as emphasized by Walter Jajko, an 
expert on intelligence and information operations, “without persistent, patient practice, 
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deception will atrophy into irrelevance, unconnected to policy and unused in 
operations.”167 
C. INTELLIGENCE 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory 
gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle. 
             —Sun-Tzu 
Knowing the enemy and understanding his real intentions is paramount. The 
intelligence function “supports this understanding with analysis of the OE to inform JFCs 
about adversary capabilities, centers of gravity (CoGs), vulnerabilities, and future COAs 
[courses of action] and to help commanders and staffs understand and map friendly, 
neutral, and threat networks.”168 
The intelligence function encompasses the joint intelligence process which consists 
of six interrelated categories of intelligence operations: 
• Planning and direction of intelligence activities. 
• Collection of data. 
• Processing and exploitation of collected data to produce relevant 
information. 
• Analysis of information and production of intelligence. 
• Dissemination and integration of intelligence with operations. 
• Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and 
quality.169 
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In war, intelligence is of the utmost importance. Following the commander’s intent, 
the joint intelligence process provides continuous intelligence support to planning, 
preparation, and execution of operations. Simultaneously, the operations process provides 
guidance and marks out the direction of intelligence effort. Hence, the intelligence and 
operations processes complement each other and facilitate the commander’s situational 
awareness. Information superiority over the enemy is indeed critical for both conventional 
armies and irregular forces. However, in an asymmetric conflict, the lack of intelligence 
affects both sides differently. A conventionally strong army can to some extent offset the 
lack of intelligence by employing its superior force to protect friendly CoGs and act upon 
apparent and discernible decisive points.  
In response to the killing of four American contractors in an ambush near Fallujah 
in March 2004, the U.S. Marines of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force stormed the city. 
The operation achieved tactical success but ended up a strategic failure for the United 
States. The battle swiftly dominated the world’s news cycle. The sheer destructiveness of 
the urban battle, intensively covered by media and fully exploited by enemy propaganda, 
soon caused international uproar and forced the Bush administration to prematurely stop 
the offensive. Ironically, the initial proposals of the on-scene commanders were just the 
contrary. Joseph Dunford, then the Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 5 commander, 
recommended protection of the friendly strategic CoG—rapport with the local populace. 
“The best we can hope for in Fallujah,” he said, “is not to lose ground with the people.”170 
His direct superior, the commander of the 1st Marine Division James Mattis, concurred. He 
intended to continue providing security through intense patrolling, gain actionable 
intelligence, and subsequently employ formidable American surgical strike capabilities to 
discriminately hunt down the perpetrators of the ambush.171 Through this course of action, 
the Americans could have compensated for their lack of intelligence by using their massive 
conventional power to protect the populace as their friendly CoG and gradually employ 
their pressure by using surgical strike capabilities. This, in theory, could have eventually 
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forced the enemy to reveal its intentions, giving the Americans more actionable 
intelligence.172   
As emphasized by Mao, intelligence on the enemy—his strength, disposition, 
composition, supply infrastructure, morale, and quality of leadership, etc.—is decisive in 
planning and conducting guerrilla operations.173 In their quest for information superiority, 
irregular forces do not differ from their conventional counterparts. However, due to their 
limited sources of men, weapons, and equipment, irregular forces cannot simply “hold the 
line” and become the anvil to find out from which direction the hammer will strike. It is 
just information superiority including the intimate knowledge of the terrain that allows 
them to fully exploit their high mobility to mass against the enemy at the right time in the 
right place.  
Lacking intelligence, irregular forces face grim prospects. After the Chechens 
retreated from Grozny in March 1995, their forces redeployed to surrounding cities and 
villages, including Argun, Chechnya’s second-largest city, which for the Russians became 
the primary objective.174 In preparation for the expected Russian assault, approximately 
200–300 Chechen fighters in Argun built an elaborated defensive line along the Argun 
river with a particular focus on the southwestern part of the city.175 However, due to the 
week-long Russian shelling of the city (the Russians learned from their previous experience 
in Grozny that sending troops into a defended city without preparation is too costly), scant 
Chechen forces were pinned down, unable to discern Russians preparations to attack from 
the northeast where they put a pontoon bridge across the river.176 Once the attack started, 
the weak Chechen forces took heavy casualties and after a fierce daylong battle, they were 
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forced to pull back and render the city to the Russians.177 Due to their low numbers, limited 
ISR capabilities, and inability to suppress Russian artillery and aerial bombardment, the 
Chechens were unable to collect sufficient data on Russian preparations to cross the river.  
However, a lot has changed since 1995. Since then, as Kilcullen points out, a 
longstanding trend of the democratization of technology has heralded an era in which 
technologies and capabilities, once reserved for nation-states, have become available to 
non-state actors as well.178 A marked example is the proliferation of unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS) technology. Drones are usually associated with great-power militaries and 
their surgical strike and ISR capabilities. However, today’s level of proliferation and 
accessibility of surveillance technology is remarkable. In 2011 at the Black Hat security 
conference, two civilian experts gave a presentation on what can be achieved when limited 
funds and off-the-shelf technology meet with enough ingenuity. In their garage, they built 
a wireless aerial surveillance platform, or WASP. The drone capable to fly a pre-
programmed route and survey a chosen area was 
built from a retired Army target drone converted from a gasoline engine to 
electric batteries, is equipped with an HD camera, a cigarette-pack sized on-
board Linux computer packed with network-hacking tools including the 
BackTrack testing toolset and a custom-built 340 million word dictionary 
for brute-force guessing of passwords, and eleven antennae… the upgraded 
WASP now also performs a new trick: impersonating the GSM cell phone 
towers used by AT&T and T-Mobile to trick phones into connecting to the 
plane’s antenna rather than their carrier, allowing the drone to record 
conversations and text messages on 32 gigabytes of storage. A 4G T-Mobile 
card routes the communications through voice-over-Internet or traditional 
phone connections to avoid dropping the call.179  
This technology has also become part of the arsenals of many non-state armed 
groups. Several terror groups have employed drones in combat. Whereas some of them like 
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have used weaponized drones to strike enemy 
forces, the benefit from using UASs still lies chiefly in the sphere of surveillance and 
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reconnaissance, and propaganda and psychological operations.180 ISIS has extensively 
used UASs on the battlefield to increase the situational awareness of their field 
commanders and harass the enemy.181 Although their drones are indeed primitive 
compared with the state-of-the-art technology of their enemies like the United States, what 
deserves attention is the organization’s efforts to incorporate UASs as a technical means 
into its tactical operations and decision-making process. An ISIS video depicting the 
assault on the Baiji oil refinery complex, released in April 2015, shows drones being used 
for C2 purposes as well as for coordinating artillery fire.182 The same footage also shows 
several ISIS members in a “tactical operations center” directing the ongoing operation.  
Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia Islamist political party and militant group with close 
ties to Iran, is the terrorist group with the most sophisticated and longstanding UAS 
program.183 In 1997, Hezbollah ambushed and nearly wiped out an Israeli SOF (Special 
Operations Forces) commando conducting a clandestine mission nearby Ansariya, a city 
on Lebanon’s coast. Hezbollah fighters monitored the Israeli advance because they 
accessed the video footage transmission from the Israeli drone providing ISR support for 
the mission.184 Besides gaining actionable intelligence, the incident created a huge 
propaganda success for the movement. Since then, Hezbollah has become increasingly 
potent in using UASs to support its operations. Due to close ties to the Iranian government, 
Hezbollah has obtained and modified UAS technology used by the Iranian military.185 In 
2004, Hezbollah flew a drone from Lebanon, violated Israeli airspace, and reportedly 
undetected by Israeli air defense remained there for approximately thirty minutes before 
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landing in the Mediterranean Sea.186 Besides the obvious potential for intelligence 
gathering, the flight across Israeli airspace also pointed out the organization’s increasing 
capability to employ weaponized drones capable of lethal strikes. On the other hand, the 
combat effectiveness of these platforms vis-à-vis the high-tech military capabilities of their 
opponents is often questionable.187 Indeed, makeshift drones or off-the-shelf quadcopters 
cannot equal the state-of-the-art UAS technology of the great powers and their allies. Yet 
the potential of the proliferation of UASs not only for data collection and intelligence 
activities is inherent. Just as Peter Singer pointed out, 
Those worried about drone proliferation must face facts. We are no longer 
in a world where only the United States has the technology, and we are not 
moving toward a future in which the technology is used only in the same 
way we use it now.188  
The underdog’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to support 
information collection on his much stronger opponent may not be constrained due to 
technological inferiority at all. The widespread digital connectivity of the modern world, a 
part of the broader trend of democratization of technology, as Kilcullen notes, offers 
irregular forces a plethora of options on how to collect and process information, and after 
processing and analyzing it, disseminate, and integrate intelligence with operations. During 
the Libyan Civil War that broke out in 2011, the rebels made up for their lack of military 
experience and armament by using people living in urbanized areas and their good 
functional knowledge of technology.189 Besides producing an array of makeshift weapons, 
the rebels made use of the evolving concept which has become known as the Internet of 
Things (IoT)—“a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced 
services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving 
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interoperable information and communication technologies.”190 After Gaddafi’s regime 
attempted to block the Internet and cut the communication network, the rebels simply 
smuggled satellite phones and important information of intelligence value recorded on 
technical devices like thumb drives, or CDs.191 Off-the-shelf gadgets and commonly used 
web applications were extensively used after the fighting with forces loyal to Gaddafi broke 
out. For example, the rebels used data from Google Maps and Google Earth in combination 
with smart-phone compass apps to coordinate and correct indirect fire or to mark enemy 
positions for NATO air-strikes.192  
Despite all advancements in technology, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) still holds 
a privileged position in the sphere of information collection. As retired CIA officer Michael 
Althoff argues, other intelligence collection disciplines (INTs) indeed significantly 
contribute to understanding adversary’s intentions, but it is HUMINT, “derived from 
human sources who are able to sit in leadership or inner circle meetings and report on plans 
and intentions and policy decisions,” that “provides a unique perspective into what a 
country really wants to do.”193 According to Mao, everybody in areas of guerrilla 
operations must be considered an agent, regardless of age, sex, or occupation.194 Mao’s 
dictums later found an attentive audience among the partisans and soldiers of Vietcong and 
the North Vietnamese Army. Months before the Tet offensive, communist guerrillas 
disguised as taxi drivers, prostitutes, businessmen, or even policemen smuggled weapons 
and ammunition into South Vietnam and, with the considerable support of the locals, 
gathered intelligence on U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, military infrastructure, and 
government buildings.195 During the first battle of Grozny, the Chechen tactics based on 
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constant movement relied heavily on timely combat information about Russian positions. 
Special intelligence diversion teams operated in conjunction with the locals to retain 
situational awareness of Chechen commanders, coordinate Chechen swarming assaults, 
and correct artillery and mortar fire.196 Russian effectiveness in intelligence gathering, 
generally very poor during the First Chechen War, improved to some extent when the 
fighting broke out again in 1999. In Grozny, Russian forces made use of the pro-federal 
Chechens led by Bislan Gantamirov, a former mayor of Grozny, whose familiarity with 
the local terrain and acquaintance with the locals often helped the Russians identify enemy 
positions and disposition.197      
Cyberspace offers substantial opportunities for intelligence collection. As a 
relatively new warfighting domain, cyberspace comprises “the digital form of software and 
human capital needed to launch destructive cyber acts, but it also includes the physical 
hardware that is located within states and territories.”198 However, cyberspace is not 
circumscribed by physical boundaries like air, sea, land, or even the space domain. The 
current Russian military thinking explicitly considers cyberspace “a subset of a wider 
information space,” and “the cognitive domain… fully subsumed into cyberspace.”199 
From the Russian perspective, cyber operations are only a part of broader efforts to gain 
control over what is considered of the utmost importance—information. As Keir Giles 
observes,  
This information can be stored anywhere, and transmitted by any means—
so information in print media, or on television, or in somebody’s head, is 
subject to the same targeting concepts as that held on an adversary’s 
computer or smartphone. Similarly, the transmission or transfer of this 
information can be by any means: so introducing corrupted data into a 
computer across a network or from a flash drive is conceptually no different 
 
196 Knezys and Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya, 78. 
197 Thomas, “Grozny 2000.” 
198 Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving 
Character of Power and Coercion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 91. 
199 Ulrik Franke, War by Non-military Means: Understanding Russian Information Warfare, Report 




from placing disinformation in a media outlet, or causing it to be repeated in 
public by a key influencer.200   
Irregular forces, technologically less advanced than their opponents and with 
limited technology-dependent INTs, must focus on the often-weakest part of the chain—
people. According to retired Russian Lieutenant General Viktor Kuznetsov, and his 
colleagues retired Colonel Yuri Donskov and retired Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Nikitin, 
today’s modern battlespace goes beyond the physical limits of air, land, and sea because it 
incorporates cyberspace, too.201 However, as previously mentioned, cyberspace itself is 
just a part of a wider information space that comprises not only the physical technical 
infrastructure but the even more important thing—the minds of soldiers and their 
commanders.202  
Irregular forces can achieve remarkable results by targeting their enemies in the 
cognitive domain. The yield may not be a revelation of top-secret information and yet can 
have a significant impact on ongoing operations. After a fitness tracking company in 
November 2017 released a data visualization map showing all the activity tracked by users 
of a Strava fitness app, it became clear that the map revealed potentially sensitive 
information on the U.S., British, and Russian military installations across the globe.203 In 
response, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a memorandum banning U.S. service 
members from using geolocation-capable devices in operational areas.204 The Russian 
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military is also fully aware of the effectiveness of social engineering. Russian lawmakers 
recently banned the use of smartphones or other recording devices in the Russian military 
due to many information leaks that compromised Russian operations in Eastern Ukraine or 
Syria.205  
In an asymmetric conflict, the conventionally weaker side cannot survive without 
maintaining information superiority over the enemy. Liddell Hart, himself an admirer of 
the irregular warfighter T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, wrote about 
guerrilla warfare: 
A prime condition of success is that the enemy must be kept “in the dark” 
while the guerrillas operate in the light of superior local knowledge 
combined with reliable news about the enemy’s dispositions and moves.206  
Historically, guerrillas prevailed when they could count upon the support of the 
local populace. For guerrillas, supportive locals were always an invaluable source of 
information. As Liddell Hart further pointed out, 
For the prospects and progress of a guerrilla movement depend on the 
attitude of the people in the area where the struggle takes place—on their 
willingness to aid it by providing information and supplies to the guerrillas 
by withholding information from the occupying force while helping to hide 
the guerrillas.207  
This indeed remains one of the decisive factors that bear on the outcome of an 
asymmetric conflict. The support of the locals helps irregular forces remain operational, 
retain situational awareness, collect information on the enemy, and stay one step ahead of 
him. Moreover, irregulars can capitalize on the fact that the population itself can become 
highly active in an asymmetric struggle. Its technical skillset and access to industrial 
facilities in urbanized areas allow ordinary people to turn many civilian gadgets and off-
the-shelf technology into weapons of war which can be used by irregular forces. This 
applies to information collection, too. Makeshift surveillance gadgets can come in handy 
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for forces who may struggle with limited options of how to collect data on a much stronger 
and technologically advanced enemy. Cyberspace and its opportunities for information 
collection also should not be omitted by irregular forces. People are fallible, including 
trained military professionals, as shown by many examples of sensitive information leaks. 
Furthermore, as Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness note, “cyber capabilities operate more in 
the ambiguous world of spies and saboteurs than they do the open battlefield.”208 The 
anonymity of cyberspace and the difficulty to attribute cyber actions to a particular 
perpetrator can possibly reduce the risk of reprisals against the civilian population.  
A small-state military must indeed develop its warfighting capabilities including all 
the intelligence collection disciplines and cyber capabilities regardless of the form in which 
the military is organized. However, the examples of “makeshift” intelligence collection 
means indicate that even a technologically inferior side is not totally without the chance to 
spy on a much stronger opponent.  
D. FIRES 
That all you got, George?! Show me something! 
    —Foreman vs Ali, “The Rumble in the Jungle”209 
Employment of fires means “to use available weapons and other systems to create 
a specific effect on a target.”210 Although fires usually produce the physical destruction of 
the target, various other tools and methods can be used to produce a nonlethal effect with 
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The need for superior mobility of irregular forces relative to their conventional 
opponents also dictates the scale of weapons they use. Although they may also possess 
heavy weapons like tanks or artillery, the bulk of their armament generally comprises small 
arms, RPGs, mortars, hand grenades and grenade launchers, and of course improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). The variety of irregular forces’ armament is infinite, but it is 
their highly mobile modus operandi that determines guerrillas’ weapons of choice. Not 
being reliant on robust logistic support and thus not presenting a solid target for superior 
enemy firepower, guerrillas armed with lighter weapons can outpace the enemy and swiftly 
mass their forces for a surprise attack, accomplish the mission and disappear before enemy 
reinforcements arrive. The main effect of lethal fires on the target does not lie in the 
destruction of enemy forces. Rather it degrades enemy morale and causes havoc and 
uncertainty among enemy troops, and slowly drains their human and material resources. 
Urban areas especially favor operations of lightly armed forces where they can take on a 
much conventionally stronger enemy. Cities with their multistore buildings, narrow streets, 
tunnels, cellars, or subways create, in the words of Paul Howe, a former Delta Force 
operator and participant of the battle of Mogadishu, “a 360-degree battlefield.”212 Urban 
battles fought out in Hue, Grozny or Fallujah represent only a fraction of the examples of 
how the highly complex urban environment can become a deadly ground for even the most 
powerful militaries.  
When fighting Russians in Grozny, Chechen fighters favored mobility over 
personal protection (they did not wear body armor) and did not fire tracers, to not 
compromise their positions.213 Not being hindered by a heavy load and led by skilled 
commanders fully exploiting decentralized C2, the Chechen mobile teams posed a constant 
threat to the Russian troops. In January 2000, the majority of Grozny was under Russian 
control, but small Chechen elements were still able to merge against Russian positions.214 
On one occasion, 13 to 16 men split into four teams armed with RPGs, a light machine 
gun, assault rifles, and sniper rifles to attack a temporarily positioned T-90 tank and two 
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trucks, guarded only by two sentries.215 After the Chechens took their pre-assault 
positions, they used silenced rifles to take out the sentries and then fired a volley of RPG 
rounds from multiple positions to knock out the tank and trucks.216 After the attack that 
lasted no more than four minutes, the Chechens swiftly withdrew to avoid Russian artillery 
fire.217   
The use of indirect fire turns city structures into rubbles that hamper an attacker’s 
advance. On the other hand, debris obscures and thus enhances defender’s positions. Direct 
fire is preferable. It can be provided by tanks, artillery, and self-propelled guns. However, 
this means a direct force-on-force confrontation with an enemy which for inherently 
weaker irregular forces is not a viable way of fighting. During the battle of Grozny, the 
Chechens set up several strongpoints built around dug-in tanks or BMPs but they rather 
preferred “defenseless defense” based on constantly moving swarms of highly mobile 
teams.218 Besides mortars and RPGs, sometimes used for indirect fire, the Chechens also 
possessed a handful of captured RPO-A Shmel (Bumblebee) flamethrowers.219 Shmel, 
sometimes referred to as “pocket artillery,” is a man-portable thermobaric disposable 
rocket launcher which generates a high-temperature explosion and overpressurized effect 
comparable to a 152mm artillery shell.220 Thermobaric weapons proved to be very 
effective in urban combat, as noted by analysts Lester Grau and Timothy Smith: 
A thermobaric strike on a unit in an urban fight is likely to be very bloody. 
Those personnel caught directly under the aerosol cloud will die from the 
flame or overpressure. For those on the periphery of the strike, the injuries 
can be severe. Burns, broken bones, contusions from flying debris and 
blindness may result. 
Further, the crushing injuries from the overpressure can create air embolism 
within blood vessels, concussions, multiple internal hemorrhages in the liver 
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and spleen, collapsed lungs, rupture of the eardrums and displacement of the 
eyes from their sockets. Displacement and tearing of internal organs can lead 
to peritonitis [sic]. Most military medics are well trained in stopping the 
bleeding, protecting the wound and treating for shock. Many of the injuries 
caused by thermobaric weapons are internal and may not be initially noticed 
by the medic or doctor.221 
The Russo-Chechen wars also saw extensive use of snipers. While both sides 
deployed snipers, the Chechens in particular fully used their knowledge of the local terrain 
and the city rubbles. Before the second battle for Grozny,   
The Chechen force had two months to prepare the city and they constructed 
a number of ambush points. The rebels had two defense lines, with the least-
skilled personnel in the front. Snipers occupied roofs and upper floors of 
buildings, controlling distant approaches to specific intersections. They 
attempted to draw the Russians out into the street. . . . Snipers also could be 
found in trenches and under concrete slabs that covered basements. These 
slabs could be raised with car jacks when Russian forces approached, 
provide ambush firing positions, and then drop back down. The attacking 
Russian force struggled to discern what was merely rubble and what was a 
kill zone.222 
IEDs are another example of how an underdog can inflict severe casualties on much 
stronger enemy forces. After all, IEDs are responsible for the majority of U.S. and 
Coalition casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Kilcullen points out, extensive usage of 
IEDs has become an inseparable part of irregular-force operations.223 In urbanized terrain, 
IEDs can deny enemy forces access to certain areas or canalize them into pre-prepared kill-
zones.224 Immediately after taking the city of Tikrit in June 2014, ISIS began with a 
complex fortification of the city, including the construction of bunkers, artillery and 
machine-gun positions and laying belts of IEDs to channel the anticipated counterattack 
into kill-zones.225 The layered defense helped the ISIS fighters repel the counterattacks of 
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Iraqi government forces in July, August, and December and inflict heavy casualties on 
them.226 Moreover, IEDs target enemy troops emotionally, exploiting their frustration 
from being hit by this depersonalized threat.227 There are a multitude of examples from 
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, when actions of frustrated coalition troops, hit by an 
IED, resulted in illegal killings. A clear example is an incident that occurred in the small 
Iraqi town of Haditha in November 2005 when a U.S. Marine squad, traveling in convoy, 
got hit by an IED with one marine killed and two wounded. In a subsequent action, the 
apparently shaken marines killed 24 noncombatants, including five Iraqis who were pulled 
out of a passing car.228 After being publicized by the press, the incident caused an 
worldwide uproar and further deepened doubts about the U.S strategy in Iraq.229 Thus, by 
using a primitive weapon of the weak, the insurgents managed to merge the lethal effect of 
IEDs with psychological effects and created an effective weapon against a much stronger 
enemy.  
Irregular warfare is inherently infantry warfare. Conflicts in Vietnam, Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, and Iraq are only the best-known examples of how effective combat infantry 
units well-trained in hit-and-run tactics and swarming can be. However, with advanced 
weapons and equipment, the combat effectiveness of infantry can be increased even more. 
With the introduction of anti-tank guided missiles, infantry became capable of knocking 
out the most powerful weapons system on the battlefield—the tank. The night vision 
devices further increased the lethality of infantry by rendering it capable of fighting at 
night.230 The rapid advance in drone technology has significantly enhanced ISR 
capabilities even at the lowest tactical level. In 2019, the Czech Republic signed a contract 
to procure several sets of Black Hornet nano drones.231 The goal is to substantially boost 
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the combat situational awareness of small units of the Czech Army. However, small and 
portable drones can also provide small units with unique precision-strike capabilities. 
These “kamikaze” drones, a part of a category of loitering munition, are capable of staying 
aloft for a short time, actively seeking a target, and engaging after its acquisition.232  
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the NATO countries most exposed to possible 
Russian military aggression. Moreover, they are also the most vulnerable due to their 
limited conventional military power. To offset the huge conventional imbalance between 
their armies and the Russian forces in the region, the Baltic states pursue unconventional 
concepts of defense.233 These concepts—known as Total Defense; a whole-of-society 
approach incorporating unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures to 
counter a conventionally much stronger enemy—are basically built around irregular 
forces. To enhance lethal fires capabilities, a recent RAND study suggests acquiring small 
arms, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), MANPADS, and demolitions along with night 
vision devices to allow for night operations.234 These categories of weapon systems 
should allow small dispersed units to take on big conventional enemy forces, hit them 
hard, and yet remain mobile enough to avoid being trapped in a disadvantageous 
force-on-force encounter.  
However, in the words of Mao, “Military action is a method used to attain a political 
goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate 
one from the other.”235 Mao, a master of irregular warfare, fully grasped the immense 
importance of the cognitive dimension of warfare. The ability to incorporate psychological 
operations into actions on the tactical and operational levels of war often generates strategic 
implications and may represent the key factor in war. The futile American “body count” 
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strategy of the Vietnam War, culminating in 1968 during the North Vietnamese Tet 
offensive, is a striking example of total incomprehension of Mao’s dictum about the 
symbiosis of war and politics. The failure to translate a decisive military victory into a 
political triumph doomed the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.236 Yet the American 
experience in Vietnam is only one of the best-known examples of a failure to control what 
is considered of the utmost importance—information. Put in other words, Americans 
allowed their enemies to weaponize information, the non-lethal effect of which became, in 
fact, far more powerful than any gun in the communist inventory. Information is the main 
“ordnance” in the inventory of Military Information Support Operations (MISO). Joint 
Publication 3-13 defines MISO as  
planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals. MISO focuses on the cognitive dimension of the information 
environment where its TA [target audience] includes not just potential and 
actual adversaries, but also friendly and neutral populations.237 
MISO is only one of the information-related capabilities (IRCs) that can be 
employed during military operations in an integrated information operations campaign.238 
A conventional JFC disposes of a large information operations cell that enables him to 
conduct operations in the information domain.239 Commanders of irregular forces may not 
have such a cell at their disposal. Yet even an underdog can dominate the information 
environment and successfully subvert enemy war efforts.  
During the first battle of Grozny, the Chechens were able to shape domestic and 
international public opinion, including perceptions of the Russian populace. Unlike the 
Russians, who were very lax in the information domain, the Chechens stayed in constant 
touch with domestic and foreign journalists, keen on giving interviews and portraying 
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themselves as victims of Russian aggression.240 And as casualties mounted and the initial 
“police” action turned into a prolonged bloody conflict, ordinary Russians, already 
scourged with economic depression, unemployment, and poverty, became a highly 
receptive target audience. With no effective Russian counter-propaganda, the battlefield 
stories and news reported on TV and in newspapers further eroded the already low public 
support for the war, putting the Russian government and Ministry of Defense officials 
under additional pressure.241 Yet the Chechens were even more creative in conducting 
information warfare. They video-recorded their combat operations against the Russians. 
As one Chechen IED team leader recalled, one member of his five-man team was assigned 
one task only—to use the camera, have enough batteries for it, and document IED attacks 
on enemy forces.242 These videos, used also for training purposes, had an apparent 
propaganda value. In Grozny, some of the tanks the Chechens had were positioned in the 
center of the city, firing on Russian positions. Subsequently, the Russian counter-fire 
hitting civilian structures and causing collateral damage was thoroughly recorded and these 
videos were used for propaganda purposes, depicting the Russians as especially 
ruthless.243  
One of the most successful actors in the weaponization of information is Hezbollah. 
This militant Shia Islamist political party operating from Lebanon has successfully merged 
combat actions with psychological operations (PSYOPs) and propaganda into unique 
PSYOP-based military modus operandi.244 The use of combat cameras is nothing new, but 
according to Ron Schleifer, an Israeli expert on psychological warfare, Hezbollah has 
raised the use of visual media to a higher level by “subjecting virtually all its military action 
to its propaganda and mass media requirements.”245 When Hezbollah fighters infiltrated 
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an Israeli Dla’at military compound in Lebanon in 1994, one of the mission’s objectives 
was to raise the organization’s flag and capture the scene on video.246 The triumphant 
shots were a huge success of Hezbollah’s propaganda which of course completely 
disregarded the fact that the Israelis successfully repelled the incursion. The video was 
perfect ammunition for propaganda targeting chiefly the Arab audience through channels 
like Al-Manar. Al-Manar (The Beacon) is a satellite TV-station broadcasting Hezbollah’s 
political and religious agendas, reaching a worldwide audience of approximately 10–15 
million viewers daily.247 Tactical operations can thus generate strategic effects with 
implications on the highest military and political levels. During the Second Lebanon War 
in 2006, Hezbollah successfully hit the Israeli corvette INS Hanit with an Iranian-supplied 
anti-ship missile, killing four crew members and causing considerable damage to the ship’s 
structure.248 Immediately after the attack, Al-Manar reported a huge military success by 
showing a video allegedly displaying the attack, complemented with a commentary of 
Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.249 What had a marginal effect on Israeli 
military operations turned into a major propaganda victory for Hezbollah and embarrassed 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) leadership. Due to the cumbersome military reporting 
chain, it took the Israeli navy about ninety minutes to understand what was going on—then 
IDF’s Chief of Staff General Dan Halutz was informed about the incident through his 
spokesperson; she got the information from a television reporter who watched the video of 
the attack that was broadcast fifteen minutes after the incident.250  
Enemies of Israel have polished the art of psychological warfare for decades. After 
Israel struck the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Beirut in 1982, President 
Ronald Reagan, disturbed by mounting civilian casualties and a television picture of a baby 
allegedly severely wounded by an Israeli strike, telephoned Prime Minister Menachem 
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Begin to express his concerns over Israeli actions.251 However, the photograph, originally 
associated with a PLO-held area of West Beirut and bombed by the Israelis, turned out to 
be a picture of a child from East Beirut, the part of the city struck by the PLO and its Syrian 
allies.252 A similar situation occurred in 1993 during Operation Accountability when the 
Israeli military employed its superior firepower against Hezbollah’s positions in Lebanon. 
Hezbollah’s subtle use of the media to one-sidedly convey the story of war destruction and 
suffering contributed to the Western public uproar. Constant TV coverage full of disturbing 
images finally compelled the international community into action and was one of the 
reasons the Clinton administration stepped in.253 From the counter-propaganda 
perspective, these examples point out the fundamental challenge. As noted by Kainikara 
and Parkin, images of war often disregard context and target viewers emotionally. 
Moreover, this completely natural human predisposition can be further reinforced by 
wittingly biased commentary.254 This is the essence of, in the words of General Sir Rupert 
Smith, “war amongst the people” which is “amplified literally and figuratively by the 
central role of the media: we fight in every living room in the world as well as on the streets 
and fields of a conflict zone.”255    
Besides mastering the art of psychological warfare, commanders of irregular forces 
must conduct operations with psychological effects in mind. For example, Hezbollah, fully 
aware of the small, close-knit Israeli society, often attacked IDF soldiers not to achieve any 
particular military end-state but to psychologically impair Israeli families and subvert their 
support for military operations in Lebanon.256 The psychological impact of war casualties 
on communities can be severe. After Great Britain entered the Great War, entire 
communities of military-aged males enlisted for military service, provided they would 
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serve in the same unit. However, when these so-called Pals battalions suffered heavy 
casualties, the impact on their cities and villages was catastrophic as the communities often 
lost a large percentage of the male population.257 Today’s modern professionalized 
militaries consist of units in which members serve together for a long time. Their family 
members often know each other very closely. Together they bear the fear and worries for 
their loved ones deployed to war and together they mourn when the worst occurs. The 
psychological impact of war casualties can thus be wide-ranging and extend far beyond a 
unit’s ranks. Needless to say, these factors should not be disregarded by irregular forces.  
The INS Hanit incident fully exposed the new reality of irregular warfare in the 
digital age. Hezbollah’s subtlety in conducting psychological operations in combination 
with the highly digitally advanced Israeli society and 24/7 media coverage enabled the 
organization to outpace hierarchically structured IDF’s C2 structure and dominate the 
information space. The incident points out two main issues that irregular forces could make 
use of. Both are related to today’s unprecedented level of connectedness—the increasing 
global connectivity among people, as Kilcullen defines it. First, the combination of over-
abundance of information and various channels of communication makes it almost 
impossible to restrict access to information. Second, as Kilcullen finds, the hierarchical 
command-and-control system of modern militaries that “requires decision-making, 
assessment, and response at various levels” can hardly control information flow on the 
battlefield.258 Of course, commanders of irregular forces must also cope with the 
challenges of the decision-making process. But their modus operandi based on fluidity and 
dispersion of force, decentralization of command and higher independence of local 
commanders make their C2 structure inherently less hierarchical and more horizontal and 
thus more appropriate to exploit the opportunities of today’s information environment. 
Kilcullen, himself a retired Australian army officer with extensive combat experience, calls 
for mandatory training in how to handle the media on the battlefield for all combat arms 
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officers.259 In the case of the state’s organized irregular forces, this kind of training must 
be supplemented with comprehensive preparation for conducting propaganda and 
information warfare. Moreover, responsibility for conducting this type of warfare must be 
delegated to the lowest effective level possible, just as in the case of any other operations 
and activities.  
The quote at the beginning of this section are is the reminiscence of one of history’s 
most famous boxing events. “The Rumble in the Jungle” boxing event took place in 
Kinshasa, Zaire, on October 30, 1974, between the challenger Muhammad Ali and 
undefeated heavyweight champion George Foreman. Ali, almost unanimously considered 
the underdog, faced a seasoned boxer with extraordinary strength. To offset Foreman’s 
strong points and exploit his overconfidence, Ali applied a cunning strategy lying in 
wearying and psychologically unnerving his opponent. As Foreman recalled, he was 
pressing Ali hard when he, around the seventh round, whispered those famous words to 
Foreman and ruined his belief in victory.260 The fight ended with Ali’s victory in the eighth 
round. In a sporting analogy of an indirect approach, Ali did not permit himself to be drawn 
into a clash of strength. Rather, he targeted Foreman’s mind with a subtle combination of 
maneuver, a resolution to receive punches, and trash-talk, and waited for the right moment 
to strike. Just like Ali, commanders of irregular forces must blend their lethal fires 
capabilities with the ability to influence their enemy’s willpower to fight. Indeed, irregular 
forces also must retain effective lethal capabilities. However, their weapons systems must 
not make them a cumbersome and static target for superior enemy firepower. Irregulars 
must keep up superior mobility relative to their enemy and apply their lethal fires skillfully. 
When killing enemy combatants, commanders of irregular forces must always keep in mind 
the psychological effects of their actions and always be ready to utilize them for 
information warfare purposes. Because the information domain might be the only enemy’s 
Achilles heel. 
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E. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 
In guerrilla warfare . . . avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; 
deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage 
a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he 
stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. 
            —Mao Tse-tung261 
According to Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, this function “encompasses 
the disposition of joint forces to conduct operations by securing positional advantages 
before or during combat operations and by exploiting tactical success to achieve 
operational and strategic objectives.”262 
The principal purpose of maneuver is to move forces into an advantageous position 
in respect to the enemy through the flexible application of movement and fires.263 To 
exploit such a position, a force commander applies the principles of mass and economy of 
force to defeat the enemy, seize territory, and control it. This is the essence of conventional 
forces’ operations. A direct force-on-force confrontation, however, is something that an 
irregular force commander can seldom afford. As Liddell Hart points out, guerrilla warfare 
“reverses the normal practice of warfare, strategically seeking to avoid battle and tactically 
by evading any engagement where it is likely to suffer losses.”264 The goal is to preserve 
irregular forces and avoid a confrontation that could result in a decisive enemy victory. 
Hence in case of irregular warfare, the principle of “concentration,” as Liddell Hart goes 
on, must be replaced by the principle of “fluidity of force” which generates dispersion—  
An essential condition of survival and success on the guerrilla side, which 
must never present a target and thus can operate only in minute particles, 
though these may momentarily coagulate like globules of quicksilver to 
overwhelm some weakly guarded objective.265   
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Besides the ability to deny the enemy opportunity to strike a solid target and at the 
same time converge their forces on target, dispersed irregulars also force the enemy to 
dissipate its forces. When applied by a skilled commander, this concept of “to be 
everywhere and nowhere,” capitalizing on unpredictability and the overspread of enemy 
forces, generates surprise and relative superiority and allows the irregular forces to take on 
an even much stronger enemy.266 Hence, relative superiority in the case of irregular forces 
replaces the principle of “concentration,” or mass. 
Speed and mobility are other prerequisites of successful maneuvers of irregular 
forces. Napoleon Bonaparte, one of history’s finest commanders and, ironically, a victim 
of irregular warfare during his Russia and Spain campaigns, emphasized the importance of 
rapidity and mobility, believing that “… aptitude for war is aptitude for movement… 
victory is to the armies which maneuver.”267 By increasing the speed of the French army, 
marching from the traditional 70 paces per minute to 120, Napoleon was able, in his own 
words, to “multiply mass by velocity” strategically as well as tactically.268 However, what 
for a conventional commander means the ability to mass his forces sooner than the enemy, 
for an irregular force commander helps to achieve the element of surprise and relative 
superiority. High mobility also increases the security of irregular forces because they do 
not pose a static and solid target.  
Lying behind the success of the Arab Revolt forces against the Ottoman Empire 
during the First World War, a combination of mobility, speed, the element of surprise, and 
relative superiority resulted from the subtle application of hit-and-run tactics and intimate 
knowledge of the terrain. This successful campaign concept, seeking to avoid pitched 
battles and attack the Turkish LOCs by highly mobile troops using camels and horses, was 
devised by Thomas Edward Lawrence, a British intelligence officer, who advised Arab 
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forces during the revolt.269 Fully aware of the Arab conventional weakness, inability to 
sustain heavy losses, and peculiar mentality of nomadic tribes, “Lawrence of Arabia” 
refrained from attacking well-defended Ottoman garrisons and sought to strike points of 
least resistance instead. Keeping with Clausewitz’s dictum “to rightly understand the war 
in which he engages,”270 Lawrence noted: 
I concluded that the tribesmen were good for defence only. Their acquisitive 
recklessness made them keen on booty, and whetted them to tear up railways, 
plunder caravans, and steal camels; but they were too free-minded to endure 
command, or to fight in team… The Hejaz war, … would be one of dervishes 
against regular troops. It was the fight of a rocky, mountainous, barren 
country (reinforced by a wild horde of mountaineers) against an enemy so 
enriched in equipment by the Germans as almost to have lost virtue for 
rough-and-tumble war. The hill-belt was a paradise for snipers; and Arabs 
were artists in sniping. Two or three hundred determined men knowing the 
ranges should hold any section of them; because the slopes were too steep 
for escalade. The valleys, which were the only practicable roads, for miles 
and miles were not so much valleys as chasms and gorges, sometimes two 
hundred yards across, but sometimes only twenty, full of twists and turns, 
one thousand of four thousand feet deep …271 
In the effort to indirectly hit the conventionally much stronger Ottoman war 
machine, Lawrence and the Arabs decided to seize a small town of Wejh what would 
position the rebel forces within the operational reach of the Hejaz railway, the only Turkish 
communication and supply link between Medina and Palestine.272 Indeed, the operation, 
as part of the overall strategy to avoid attacking the bulk of the Turkish forces, was linked 
with some level of risk. To muster enough troops, the Arabs had to leave some of their 
strongpoints defenseless.273 This posed the classic challenge of warfare which lies in 
considering the factors of time, space, and force—to strike as swiftly as possible, with a 
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sufficient force, in the right place.274 However, after considering all the pros and cons and 
being assured of British naval support, Lawrence and the Arab forces successfully carried 
out the operation and seized the town. The Wejh operation thus not only gave the rebel 
forces an advantageous position against the vital target but also forced the Ottoman forces 
to focus primarily on guarding the railway which at the same time precluded them from 
effectively chasing the rebels.275  
Yet the Arab operations were not restricted solely to raids, ambushes, and taking 
lightly defended posts. Thanks to their positional advantage and ability to achieve relative 
superiority, they mustered enough forces to occasionally attack larger Turkish garrisons. 
After the seizure of Wejh, the key port of Akaba came to the interest of the Arab forces. 
The seizure of the port would enable the Arabs to extend their front, replenish their reserves 
of food, money, and guns, and linked them with the troops of the British Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force.276 In July 1917, Lawrence and the Arabs, supported by the British 
Navy, raided the port which was guarded by nearly 1,200 Turks.277 The surprise attack 
resulted in approximately 300 Turks killed in action and the rest captured.278 The fall of 
Akaba finally proved the relevance of Lawrence’s irregular concept of operations even in 
the eyes of those initially skeptical about the Revolt’s potential. General Sir Edmund 
Allenby, the British commander in the Middle East, saw Lawrence and his partner forces 
as a highly efficient means of increasing pressure on the Ottoman army and facilitating his 
conventional operations.279 The rebel forces, however, did not always fight as dispersed 
raiders. After the capture of the small town of Tafileh in January 1918, Lawrence and his 
small force fought out a pitched battle against a superior Turkish force that tried to retake 
the town. During the encounter, Lawrence repelled the attack by skillfully employing his 
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tiny forces in a series of flanking maneuvers and pincer attacks, supported by mortars and 
rifle and machine-gun fire.280  
Through maneuver, a force commander masses “forces at decisive points to achieve 
surprise, psychological effects, and physical momentum” as well as “enable or exploit the 
effects of massed of precision fires.”281 T. E. Lawrence indeed understood this when he 
made up his concept of operations by stating the following: 
Our aim was to seek the enemy’s weakest material link and bear only on that 
till time made their whole length fail. Our largest resources, the Bedouin on 
whom our war must be built, were unused to formal operations, but had 
assets of mobility, toughness, self-assurance, knowledge of the country, 
intelligent courage. With them dispersal was strength. Consequently, we 
must extend our front to its maximum, to impose on the Turks the longest 
possible passive defence, since that was, materially, their most costly form 
of war.282  
Actions of small dispersed units, the essence of irregular warfare, thus proved to be 
effective even against a conventionally superior enemy. However, this concept can be 
enhanced by what is indeed nothing new in the history of warfare—swarming.  
In their study on swarming and its implications for warfare, John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt define swarming as “the systematic pulsing of force and/or fire by 
dispersed, internetted units, so as to strike the adversary from all directions 
simultaneously.”283 The concept of swarming, ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, has been 
used in warfare throughout centuries by standing armies as well as irregulars. Some of the 
masters of irregular warfare employed swarm forces with great success to impose havoc 
on the enemy and disrupt cohesion of his forces.284 Swarming and hit-and-run tactics, 
however, may not automatically be synonymous. Both capitalize on the use of small 
dispersed units and the elements of surprise, relative superiority, mobility, and speed. 
However, swarming requires taking on the enemy from multiple directions simultaneously 
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and (what is extremely important) demands the swarm forces also to operate as “sensors” 
to ensure a necessary flow of information to provide a commander with situational 
awareness.285 This is indeed crucial to the commanders’ ability to converge all units on 
the target and generate the effect of systematic pressure on the enemy. The result is 
increased combat effectiveness and security because, as Sean Edwards argues in his 
monograph on the battlefield effects of swarming, “each individual swarm unit is 
vulnerable on its own, but if it is united in a concerted effort with other friendly units, 
overall lethality can be multiplied, because the phenomenon of the swarm effect is greater 
than the sum of its parts.”286 
Through an analysis of several historical cases, Edwards identifies three 
prerequisites for successful swarming: 
• Elusiveness—either through mobility or concealment; 
• A longer range of firepower—standoff capability; 
• Superior situational awareness.287  
These factors indeed played a vital role during wars in Indochina where irregular 
Vietnamese formations under the command of Vo Nguyen Giap successfully employed 
swarms first against the French army and then against the combined forces of the United 
States and its South Vietnamese ally. Giap, an avid student of Mao, another master of 
irregular warfare, combined the Chinese leader’s ideas with those of Napoleon Bonaparte 
who dislocated his enemies by attacking several targets at once.288 By numerous acts of 
sabotage and striking the French positions simultaneously from multiple directions, both 
in rural and urban areas, Giap’s forces performed swarming at the tactical as well as 
operational level.289 The Viet Minh, the Vietnamese national independence coalition, took 
advantage of the French army’s tendency to hold a large number of strongpoints. This 
strategy was heavy on manpower, which hindered the ability of the French forces to 
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conduct offensive operations against the insurgents. The resulting Viet Minh domination 
of rural areas and the local populace, in conjunction with limited mobility, made the French 
forces dependent upon the roads and therefore more vulnerable to ambushes.290  
Of course, these encounters with a strong enemy inflicted heavy losses on the 
Vietnamese troops, only confirming the general truth that an irregular warfare campaign 
should not seek primarily the physical destruction of an enemy. After taking heavy 
casualties in campaigns of 1950 and ‘51, however, Giap showed enough soundness to 
resort to simple hit-and-run tactics, avoid major encounters with the French, and restore 
forces for another strategic offensive that was about to occur in Laos, then under the French 
colonial control.291 Fearing the communist destabilization in hitherto calm areas, the 
French command decided to seize the area around a small town called Dien Bien Phu, use 
it as a base of operations from which to cut off Viet Minh supply lines, and possibly drag 
their opponents into a set piece battle of attrition. However, this approach committed the 
French forces to a static defense and precluded them from being proactive, because, as 
Kissinger observed, “if the communists chose to ignore the French deployment, these 
forces would be wasted in a position far from areas of any strategic consequences. If the 
communist took the bait, their [French] sole motive had to be the belief that they were 
within sight of decisive victory.”292 And the French were not about to achieve a victory 
whatsoever. Their overconfidence in firepower and ability to supply the base via air in 
combination with their underestimation of Giap’s ability to mass enough troops and guns 
(including anti-aircraft artillery) and sustain these forces for a longer period of time led to 
a disastrous defeat. Viet Minh’s main assault began on March 13, 1954. The initial 
onslaught, supported by heavy artillery, swiftly overwhelmed two of the major French 
outposts.293 However, the resolute and skillful defense also inflicted heavy casualties on 
the attacking forces, forcing Giap to change his tactics from conventional frontal assaults 
to piecemeal destruction of the enemy by using swarms of small teams, attacking mostly 
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at night.294 The bitter fighting ended on May 7, 1954 with the French surrender after they 
lost about 3,000 dead and 2,000 indigenous desertions, out of the initial 15,000 men.295 
Giap’s forces took 23,000 casualties, including 8,000 dead.296 
In the struggle against the French forces, Viet Minh, under Giap’s command, often 
employed swarming on the tactical and operational levels, exploiting the enemy’s inferior 
mobility and general inability to mass forces for offensive operations. Thanks to the 
insurgents’ elusiveness even the heavy Viet Minh defeats in 1950 and ‘51 proved not to be 
decisive as the generally reactive Frenchmen failed to exploit their tactical victories. The 
overall French deficient situational awareness and inability to find their opponents often 
rendered their superior firepower irrelevant. On the other hand, the communist forces offset 
their inferiority in firepower by closing in on the enemy from multiple directions—
swarming by force.297 Moreover, during the siege of Dien Bien Phu, Giap was able to 
provide his forces with the standoff fire capability and deny the French air forces to 
resupply the garrison.  
After the Americans became involved in Indochina and eventually resorted to a 
direct military confrontation, Giap and his forces had to fight another and even more 
formidable enemy. In the years after the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution which granted 
U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson authorization to use military force in South East Asia 
until the suspension of U.S. combat operations in early 1973, the Americans inflicted 
tremendous casualties upon the communist forces. Yet Giap and his troops fought back by 
waging an irregular warfare campaign, often striking American and South Vietnamese 
forces from every direction at several places at once, both at the tactical and operational 
levels. By realizing that the Americans’ Achilles heel lied in their shaky domestic support, 
the North Vietnamese fought their opponents until they finally broke the American will to 
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fight, just as per Clausewitz’s dictum that “resistance is a form of action, aimed at 
destroying enough of the enemy’s power to force him to renounce his intentions.”298  
According to Napoleon, movement is the soul of war.299 As every commander who 
tries to gain a positional advantage over an enemy, a commander of irregular forces also 
maneuvers his forces through the combination of moves and fires while using all available 
information. However, his decisions must be generally driven by the goal not to take on 
the enemy in direct force-on-force approach. Given his relative conventional weakness in 
comparison with the enemy, he must find a different way to dislocate his opponent. 
Synchronized actions of small, dispersed and highly mobile units, attacking enemy forces 
from multiple directions and achieving relative superiority through speed and surprise, is a 
historically proven and feasible way of how to move and maneuver against a 
conventionally much stronger enemy.  
F. PROTECTION 
What can be seen can be hit; what can be hit can be destroyed. 
    —General William E. DePuy, U.S. Army300 
Besides the force health protection and other protection activities, the protection 
function also encompasses force protection.301 Its role is to preserve the force and its 
fighting capabilities.302 Force protection comprises the use of active defensive measures 
to protect the force and its critical nodes as well as passive defensive measures “that make 
friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy by reducing 
the probability of, and minimizing the effects of, damage caused by hostile action without 
the intention of taking the initiative.”303 
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Liddell Hart described guerrilla warfare as a struggle of the few supported by the 
many.304 It is important to protect the few. Irregular forces’ most valuable asset, as in any 
other military organization, is people. And people, whether they are commanders at 
whatever level or common warriors, represent a node which an adversary may try to attack 
and eliminate. In combat, commanders or other high-value individuals can be deliberately 
targeted by the enemy who seeks to disrupt the C2 structures and cohesion of forces. 
Specialists like radio operators are important targets because their elimination can 
significantly hamper a unit’s combat effectiveness. However, important figures may 
become targets of enemy actions even before the commencement of hostilities. The enemy 
can try to obtain all available information about persons of interest to locate and eliminate 
them when the time is ripe. Therefore, personal files and data concerning individuals and 
organizations which play a crucial role in the country’s defense—or potentially in 
resistance after a country gets occupied—must be protected.  
Once Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in January 1933, a road to a new war 
of conquest was paved. Hitler’s regime leaned upon a powerful persecution apparatus that 
helped to consolidate the Nazi reign within Germany and later in areas and territories under 
the Reich’s control. The elaborated police and intelligence machinery collected 
information on individuals, groups of people and organizations considered by the regime 
alien or dangerous. One of the most powerful pillars of the Nazi rule was the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the infamous security service of the SS.305 Formed in 1932 by 
Reinhard Heydrich, the SD’s initial task was to gather information and spy on political 
opponents of the Nazis. After Hitler became the German Chancellor, the SD extended its 
activities by collecting data on Jews, Freemasons, churches, and other supposed “enemies 
of the state.”306 In the mid-1930s, after securing his rule in Germany, Hitler concluded that 
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the time became ripe for expansion. The remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 
was followed by the annexation of Austria in March 1938.  
Yet before the first echelons of the German troops entered Vienna the morning of 
March 12, 1938, Heydrich and his men arrived in the Austrian capital to secure secret 
police files and orchestrate the first wave of arrests.307 Arrested were all who could 
potentially lead any opposition or resistance against the new regime. A deliberate roundup 
of all real or potential opponents began almost immediately. SD and SiPo officers, armed 
with lists of names, went into action. Thousands of people, including members of the 
former government, communists, German emigrants, Austrian royalists, and former 
leading members of the Heimwehr (the conservative Home Defense League) were arrested 
and sent either to the Dachau concentration camp or to a newly built camp in 
Mauthausen.308 The Austrian campaign also witnessed the first deployment of the 
infamous Einsatzgruppen, or “task forces.”309 Einsatzgruppen followed the first echelon 
of German forces and were task to establish security in newly seized territories. During the 
Anschluss, these ad-hoc formed detachments were given the task of securing government 
buildings and offices and important documents.310 Einsatzgruppen also extensively 
operated against the Austrian Jews. A special SD commando was tasked to arrest Jewish 
officials—based on the previously compiled list—and secure documents from Jewish 
organizations.311  
The next step was Czechoslovakia. Fall Grün, or Case Green, the German war plan 
against Czechoslovakia, called for a comprehensive intelligence evaluation of the country, 
its infrastructure, and military capabilities. The SD commenced intelligence operations 
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against Czechoslovakia in 1937 by sending agents disguised as tourists, photographing 
everything from the border fortifications and airfields to important buildings like police 
stations, military installations, and post offices.312 Besides the military intelligence 
activities, Heydrich also did not neglect the plans for “anti-VIP” operations. Two 
Einsatzgruppen, split up into eleven Einsatzkommandos and comprising 863 men, were 
activated for the planned war.313 However, the war was averted at the last moment. In 
1938, Great Britain and France, fearful of a new European war, were already heavily 
paralyzed by their appeasement policies. The policy of concessions toward Hitler 
culminated in the infamous Munich conference held on September 29–30, 1938. During 
this emergency meeting, the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy 
signed an agreement based on which the Czechoslovak government would cede to Hitler 
the border regions known as the Sudetenland. Although Heydrich’s Einsatzgruppen did 
not go to war, their preparation proved to be “fruitful” anyway. On October 1, the German 
Wehrmacht crossed the Czechoslovak border and annexed the Sudetenland, followed by 
the Einsatzkommandos arresting all political opponents whose names were on the special 
detention list.314 The destruction of Czechoslovakia was completed in March 1939 when 
the Czech territories became the Reich’s protectorate and the Slovak leaders declared the 
pro-Nazi puppet Slovak State. 
After Hitler completed the destruction of crippled Czechoslovakia, he focused on 
Poland. This time he was ready to get his war at all costs. This was about to be the racial 
war of annihilation which sought to conquer the Lebensraum, or living space, for the 
German people. On August 22, 1939, Hitler informed his military commanders of his 
decision to attack Poland even if it led to war with Great Britain and France.315 During the 
meeting, he stressed the importance of ruthlessness and brute force: 
Close your hearts to pity. Act brutally. Eighty million people must obtain 
what is their right. Their existence must be made secure. The greatest 
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harshness. … Any failures will be due solely to leaders having lost their 
nerve. The wholesale destruction of Poland is the objective. Speed is the 
chief thing. Pursuit until complete annihilation.316 
The German campaign against Poland sought the complete destruction of the Polish 
state and elimination of the Poles as a nation through the annihilation of all individuals who 
could oppose Nazi rule. The SD and Gestapo, or Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State 
Police), had taken extensive preparation to fulfill Hitler’s goals. They had compiled the 
Sonderfahndungsbuch Polen (Special Prosecution Book-Poland), the list of approximately 
61,000 people—public officials, municipal leaders, landowners and businessmen, students 
and teachers, officers, lawyers, the heads of social organizations, priests, nuns, and war 
veterans—who could potentially become leaders of the future Polish resistance.317 The list 
served as a guideline for operations of five (later seven) Einsatzgruppen, operating in the 
Wehrmacht’s rear.318 Up to April 1940, 50,000 people had been murdered during these 
actions, carried out under the code name Tannenberg. Another 50,000 Poles had been sent 
to concentration camps.319 The Einsatzgruppen were systematically scouring the 
Wehrmacht’s rear for all persons of interest, mainly killing them on sight, often with the 
active support of the Wehrmacht and ethnic German militias.320 On September 27, the day 
before the fall of Warsaw, Heydrich reported that “of the Polish leadership, there remained 
in the occupied area at most 3 percent.”321 
The hell that the Nazis unleashed in Poland was just the first step in the 
implementation of their plans to create a new German empire in the East. However, when 
the French and the British refused his “peace” proposals offered after the Polish campaign, 
Hitler had to send his armies against the Western allies, defeat France and attempt to cross 
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the English Channel to neutralize the British threat. Once again Heydrich’s henchmen 
created a list of “undesirable” individuals. The Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. (Special Search 
List Great Britain) comprised the names of 2,820 individuals including important political 
figures like Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee.322 Operation Seelöwe (Sea Lion), the 
German amphibious assault plan, called for the destruction of the British Royal Airforce 
(RAF) before crossing the channel. However, in the Battle of Britain, Hitler suffered his 
first major defeat after the Luftwaffe failed to break the heroic opposition of the RAF, 
reinforced by pilots from many foreign countries including those from occupied 
Czechoslovakia and Poland.  
After the German defeat in the Battle of Britain, Operation Sea Lion was postponed 
indefinitely. Despite his stated aim to never fight a war on two fronts, on December 18 
Hitler signed Directive No. 21 for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, 
tasking the German armed forces to defeat Soviet Russia “even before the conclusion of 
the war against England.”323 To achieve this goal, Germany assembled the largest army 
ever fielded for one military campaign. Operation Barbarossa represented the climax of 
Hitler’s war. For him, it was the Vernichtungskrieg, the war of annihilation, which should 
destroy the Jewish-bolshevism menace and create the Lebensraum for the German 
Herrenvolk (master race). Four Einsatzgruppen, since September 1939 oversaw by the 
Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), were organized for the Eastern campaign. Soon after 
the start of the war, they were reinforced by additional formations of auxiliary forces from 
the occupied Baltic States and Ukraine which operated under the German command.324 
Heydrich’s men followed the verified pattern of action that was previously used in Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. By utilizing information from lists compiled beforehand, 
confiscated police files, and the cooperation with local collaborators, the SD/SiPo 
formations targeted communist party members, Red Army commissars, and notably Jews. 
Holocaust, the planned extermination of the Jewish population in Europe, was fully set in 
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motion. How the elaborated police and intelligence apparatus of the Third Reich worked is 
clearly described in the remarks of one SS officer whose unit operated in the Caucasus: 
As a group leader I was sent supplementary documentation. By far the most 
valuable was a slim little book, part of a limited, numbered edition, which I 
never let out of my sight. The typeface was tiny, I remember, and the paper 
was extra thin, in order to pack the most information into the smallest 
possible space. … It consisted of a series of lists, including the names of 
every active member of the Communist party in the Caucasus, all the 
nonparty intelligentsia, and listings of scholars, teachers, writers and 
journalists, priests, public officials, upwardly mobile peasants, and the most 
prominent industrialists and bankers. [It contained] addresses and telephone 
numbers. … And that wasn’t all. There were additional listings of relatives 
and friends, in case any subversive scum tried to hide, plus physical 
descriptions, and in some cases photographs. You can imagine what the size 
of that book would have been if it had been printed normally.325 
SD/SiPo operations during World War II are a clear example of how important is 
to deny the enemy access to the files of individuals and organizations critical for the 
country’s defense. This is of critical importance for every state and its military. However, 
in the case of irregular forces facing a much stronger, often technologically superior, enemy 
it must be stressed that a deliberate plan of destruction of sensitive files must exist. Only 
days before the German invasion of crippled Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Frantisek 
Moravec, the chief of Czechoslovak military intelligence, at the last moment fled the 
country along with a handful of key members of his staff and the most important 
documents.326 Documents he could not take were destroyed. However, Moravec was 
permitted to burn these files just hours before the German intelligence officers arrived at 
the building of the Second Bureau of the Czechoslovak General Staff (the military 
intelligence bureau).327 Thus, a potentially disastrous situation was averted.  
Protection of sensitive data in the context of the creation of resistance after a 
country is overrun and occupied is vital, indeed. When a small state’s defense plan counts 
upon an irregular warfare campaign as the way of how to oppose the enemy, failure to 
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protect sensitive files may rule out the creation of any resistance right in the beginning. For 
example, in modern militaries, the role of special operations forces in military campaigns 
due to their ability to operate in denied areas is significant.328 However, it is hard to 
imagine these soldiers performing clandestine missions when the enemy knows their 
identities or even possesses information on their families. Of course, this goes for 
everybody who may play a role in resistance activities.  
In future wars, however, an enemy will not need to send Heydrichs and Himmlers 
to personally acquire classified files or sensitive information. Perhaps the most distinctive 
feature of the twenty-first century is the swift spread of digital technologies and the 
increasing importance of cyberspace.329 The technology of the digital age has enabled 
civilians as well as soldiers to communicate, share and store information at a level never 
seen before. However, cyberspace is also used for malicious activities. According to the 
Verizon 2018 Data Breach Investigation Report, over 53,000 real-world cyber incidents 
occurred that year, including 2,216 confirmed data breaches.330 Out of them, 76 percent 
were financially motivated and 13 percent were conducted to gain a strategic advantage 
(espionage).331 However, as the report points out, the higher number of financially 
motivated incidents was due to the few larger and thoroughly investigated cases. Moreover, 
espionage cases typically last longer and are more difficult to detect.332 In any case, 
malicious activities in cyberspace can not only inflict extensive financial damage but pose 
a significant threat to national security.  
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In June 2015, the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
announced that its servers had been attacked. According to a U.S. government report, in 
what appeared  
to be a coordinated campaign to collect information on government 
employees, attackers exfiltrated personnel files of 4.2 million former and 
current government employees and security clearance background 
investigation information on 21.5 million individuals. Additionally, 
fingerprint data of 5.6 million of these individuals was stolen.333  
In a long-term and sophisticated attack, the hackers accessed files of millions of 
current and former federal employees, including contractors and military personnel. The 
hacked database included highly sensitive Standard Form 86 questionnaires that must be 
filled and submitted by every applicant for a government job. SF-86, an important 
document in the background investigation of applicants for the U.S. security clearance, 
includes sensitive information on the applicant as well as on applicant’s relatives.334 
Although the perpetrator of the attack is not clear, the postattack forensics and evidence 
gained associate the hack with China which assertiveness and malicious activities in 
cyberspace are well-known.335 In any case, the OPM hack and its scope presented a serious 
blow to the U.S. national security due to “the intelligence and counterintelligence value of 
the stolen background information for a foreign nation.”336 The subsequent investigation 
of the OPM data theft revealed significant missteps and sloppiness in cyberspace security 
and in an area that is (or should be) well-known to all military personnel—OPSEC.337 
OPSEC is defined as “a capability that identifies and controls critical information, 
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indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates 
countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities.”338 OPSEC 
has always played a substantial role in military operations. Failure to meet OPSEC 
requirements can result in severe impediments to the conduct of military operations or even 
prove to be disastrous.  
After the relatively bloodless Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the situation 
soon turned into a bloody long-term conflict. Since the very beginning of the war, 
Ukrainian forces have been confronted with advanced Russian EW capabilities ready to 
exploit any negligent behavior in cyberspace or weak points in enemy C2 structure. During 
the battle of Ilovaisk in August 2014, Russian EW systems monitored Ukrainian 
communications transmissions, including cellphones, to triangulate enemy positions for 
subsequent artillery strikes.339 Ilovaisk was not an isolated instance of successful Russian 
cyberspace operations. According to CrowdStrike, a U.S. cybersecurity technology 
company, a Russian cyberespionage group known as Fancy Bear, likely tied to the Russian 
Military Intelligence (GRU), managed to infect Android app commonly used by Ukrainian 
artillery units to quickly compute target coordinates.340 According to Crowdstrike, the 
installed malware enabled the Russians to retrieve information on Ukrainian artillery 
positions and resulted in heavy losses of D-30 towed howitzers.341 Negligent use of cell-
phones by Ukrainian troops was also exploited by the Russian side in the area of 
psychological operations. To undermine the enemy’s morale, the Russians sent Ukrainian 
soldiers text messages with negative content.342 Moreover, this psychological campaign 
was not restricted only to combatants. By hacking mobile phones of Ukrainian soldiers, 
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the Russians accessed information on their relatives who received disturbing messages to 
demoralize them.343 
That the threat emanating from the combination of poor OPSEC, insufficient 
cyberspace security, and enemy EW and information warfare capabilities is real, was 
clearly shown during a recent NATO military exercise in Europe. During the military 
maneuvers, researchers at NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (a 
research group that is affiliated with NATO), conducted a phony information campaign 
aimed at NATO soldiers. By utilizing open-source data from social media like Facebook 
and Twitter, StratCom researchers obtained important information about troop movement 
and locations. They even succeeded in forcing the soldiers to leave their positions against 
orders.344 
Information protection and denial of an adversary’s access to it have ever been 
inherent to war and conflict. However, it is important to understand that the need for 
protection of sensitive information and secret files does not start with the first-round shot. 
Examples of operations of the Nazi SD before the start of every German campaign clearly 
demonstrate that the negligence in the area of information protection during peacetime can 
prove to be fatal after a war starts. The digital age has only raised the challenges of 
information protection vis-à-vis skillful and capable adversaries. The coercive potential of 
cyber espionage is clearly described by Jensen, Valeriano, and Maness: 
accessing target networks sets the conditions for follow-up operations. 
In military parlance, you prepare the environment for future action. Not only 
do you access critical networks and steal information altering the balance 
of information in a crisis, but even if the intrusion is revealed, the target 
is left wondering what else was stolen and what other networks are 
compromised.345  
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Such a situation poses a serious threat to every state and its military. However, for 
an actor technologically less advanced and militarily weaker it is even greater. Thus, denial 
of adversary’s access to sensitive files during peacetime is of particular importance for a 
small state’s military that may find itself waging an irregular warfare campaign during a 
country’s occupation. Poor OPSEC represents another threat that can jeopardize operations 
at the tactical as well as operational level. However, as the Russian information operations 
in Ukraine indicate, a negligent attitude towards OPSEC can also facilitate enemy actions 
at the strategic level and allow him to target the adversary’s domestic support and national 
resilience. 
General DePuy’s quote at the beginning of this section reminds us of every 
military’s never-ending chase to go unseen by the enemy. Indeed, this has not changed in 
the course of history. Because in every era and regardless of any technology, the principle 
has always been the same—what can be seen can be hit; and what can be hit can be 
destroyed. 
G. SUSTAINMENT 
A lawyer is a resistance hero. 
                —LTC Margus Kuul, Estonian SOF346 
Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, defines sustainment as “the provision of 
logistics and personnel services to maintain operations through mission accomplishment 
and redeployment of the force.”347  
Today’s conventional militaries rely on a large and complex system of logistical 
support required to keep their combined arms operations in motion. However, this system 
consisting of various facilities, bases, and logistic forces moving along LOCs is a preferred 
target of enemy forces. Hence, for friendly forces, it is of the utmost importance to protect 
the system and prevent the enemy from cutting its vital arteries. The problem is that 
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whereas big militaries possess the capabilities to sustain their forces in combat and protect 
their LOCs, for small-state militaries and/or irregular forces it may pose a significant 
challenge. Given the superior ISR capabilities and immense stand-off firepower of great-
power militaries, the sustainment of the underdog forces deployed in a classic conventional 
manner may not even be possible.  
During the Vietnam War, the forces of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the 
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, or Viet Cong (VC), relied highly on 
the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail. The trail, a logistical artery comprised of roads and paths 
and running from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia, enabled 
the VC and NVA to sustain their operations at the regimental or even divisional level for 
years on end. During the war, the communist forces demonstrated incredible ingenuity and 
organizational talent to move hundreds of tons of supplies. However, as Vietnam veteran 
David Hackworth noted, had the Americans cut the flow of supplies it would have 
significantly impeded VC and NVA operations in the south.348 His former enemies concur. 
According to Bui Tin, a retired NVA Colonel, a large U.S. ground operation in Laos 
targeting the Ho Chi Minh Trail would have destroyed the entire communist supply 
infrastructure.349 Since the end of the war, the highly conventional American approach has 
been widely criticized. How a massive conventional operation leading to successful 
interdiction of the trail could have affected the course of the war is another question.  
Hence, due to an irregular forces’ limited capability to prevent the enemy from 
interdicting their LOCs and destroying their supply system, they must rely upon a different 
approach. This approach would not differ too much from what the Special Operations 
Forces conduct to shape the operational environment. U.S. Army Special Forces conduct 
nine principal tasks including preparation of the environment. Preparation of environment, 
a type of shaping activity, comprises various activities conducted by Special Forces to 
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prepare the operational environment for potential or future operations.350 This includes, 
but is not limited to, “activities include passive observation, area familiarization, site 
surveys, mapping the information environment, military source operations, developing 
nonconventional assisted recovery capabilities, use of couriers, developing safe houses and 
assembly areas, positioning transportation assets, and cache emplacement and 
recovery.”351 Many of these activities are conducted to enable Special Forces to operate 
in a hostile environment with limited or nonexistent logistical support. These aspects are 
also peculiar to operations and activities of irregular forces. However, if a state founds its 
defense plan on an irregular warfare campaign, it will inevitably face significant legislative 
challenges. The reason is clear and simple. Especially in the case of Western-type 
democracies, the employment of a military on a country’s own soil is a very sensitive issue. 
For obvious reasons, it can happen only under specific circumstances, following the 
constitution and rule of law, and adhere to strict rules of engagement. However, shaping 
activities to prepare a country—a potential battlefield—for an irregular warfare campaign 
must be done in peacetime long before a crisis materializes and requires the active 
participation of a nation’s military. These activities include the foundation of the physical 
infrastructure that would support operations of irregular forces. As summarized in a recent 
study on resistance and national preparation for an occupation,   
Supplies such as cash, weapons and ammunition, medical equipment, and 
communication equipment necessary for resistance operations should be 
obtained prior to a crisis. These materials can be stored and maintained in 
pre-planned locations or cached centrally under the authority of a designated 
government agency awaiting distribution orders. Cache sites should be 
surveyed, designated, prepared, and supplied as and when needed. Material 
can be placed at the cache sites on a permanent basis or used as a 
combination of pre-storage and distribution to caches on order. The 
government should also ensure sufficient funding and logistics to support all 
other preparatory activities and must incorporate this aspect into their legal 
framework. The government can authorize caches of certain materials (e.g., 
weapons and ammunition) outside of government or military facilities 
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during peacetime or only allow sites to be stocked during certain pre-crisis 
events or upon the onset of a designated crisis.352         
Therefore, it is critically important to understand that if a state decides to organize 
its defense around irregular forces, the first and foremost task is to create a legal framework 
that would enable setting the plans and preparations in motion. To paraphrase the current 
Estonian SOF commander, LTC Margus Kuul, lawyers and experts on constitutional law 
are the first line of a country’s defense. They must be integrated into strategic defense 
planning. They must closely cooperate with military leaders to understand the nuances and 
requirements of an irregular warfare campaign planning and preparation. Only then they 
can advise the country’s highest political and military leaders on related legal issues.353 
Conversely, military leaders must realize the legal setbacks that in democracies may 
hamper some of the shaping activities and plan accordingly. In sum, without a proper legal 
framework, any meaningful defense plan based on IW/UW approach cannot really exist. 
When it comes to weapons and equipment, even a small-state military can procure 
and store a formidable stock of advanced weaponry and equipment. However, a superior 
enemy could limit or even disrupt resupply and thus expose an underdog to a lack of 
weapons, ammunition, and other vital supplies. Furthermore, due to the combination of 
combat attrition and limited reinforcement options, irregular forces may face a challenge 
of manpower replenishment, chiefly in critical specialties like combat medics, demolition 
experts, or communication specialists. Equally important are the psychological trauma-
related casualties resulting from combat operations and long-term combat stress. For 
irregular forces with limited rear services, treatment of this type of casualty may pose a 
real problem.  
In the case of irregular forces, the combination of combat attrition, fragile logistics, 
and vulnerable supply infrastructure may result in a critical shortage of weapons and 
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ammunition. Hence, the lack of tools of war must be often offset with inventiveness. 
Makeshift weapons of all imaginable categories are an inseparable part of irregular forces’ 
inventory. To hit the Russian armor during the First and Second Chechen Wars, the 
Chechen fighters depended mainly on RPG-7 and RPG-18. To increase the RPG-7 round’s 
effect, the Chechens attached two 400 gram pieces of trotyl explosive to create a “fuga,” 
which proved to be highly effective in interiors and as an incendiary anti-tank weapon.354 
RPGs were the most prevalent anti-armor weapons in the Chechen arsenal; however, due 
to their limited range, the Chechens were often unable to exploit favorable tactical 
situations and had to resort to very risky or almost suicidal actions to approach the Russian 
tanks. Yet even the RPGs were often in short supply. To replenish their stockpile of anti-
tank weapons, the Chechens used the Russian S-5 and S-8 air-to-ground rockets they 
recovered from downed fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.355 For both high-explosive anti-
tank (HEAT) and high-explosive (HE) warheads they retrieved from the aircraft launch 
tubes, the Chechens fashioned homemade launchers with makeshift trigger mechanisms 
and sights.356 These improvements made the Shaitan (Devil) effective in hundreds of 
battles and skirmishes against Russian armored vehicles. As one fighter recalled, “That’s 
it. You put it on your shoulder and from 2.5 kilometers I can fire a rocket from my 
homemade shoulder-fired launcher and hit Russian armor.”357  
For another option on evening up the shortage of critical supplies, irregular forces 
can draw on the technical skillset of the civilian population that especially in cities has 
access to advanced technologies and material that could be used for military purposes.358 
Fertilizers used for the production of IEDs that are triggered by cellphones are well-known 
examples of how the products of consumer society can be converted into weapons of war. 
IEDs, however, form just a fraction of the infinite options on how to make use of the 
industrial base and knowledge of modern societies for war. As the Syrian popular uprising 
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has shown, inventiveness and technical skills along with access to industrial facilities 
allows the rebels to produce a number of makeshift weapons ranging from low-tech 
medieval-like weaponry to high-tech solutions like remotely operated weapon station 
consisting of a machine gun and a videogame controller linked to a flat-screen TV.359   
Preservation of manpower and combat effectiveness of irregular forces is another 
challenge. In general, the survival of these forces vis-à-vis a high attrition rate depends on 
the strong core of the best trained and experienced personnel who also serve as instructors 
and subject-matter experts (SMEs) responsible for the training of other members of their 
units. Samir Saleh Abdullah, a Saudi-born Wahhabi better known as Al-Khattab, joined 
the Chechen insurgency in 1995 and commanded foreign fighters in Chechnya until his 
death in 2002. According to many Chechen veterans, Khattab’s military skills were his best 
contribution to the Chechen cause.360 During the interwar period, he set up a training camp 
where hundreds of Chechens underwent training in small unit tactics.361 During the second 
battle of Fallujah, the fiercest hubs of resistance the U.S. Marines encountered were built 
around foreign jihadists, including the Chechen veterans, who were by far the most 
fanatical, better equipped, and better trained than the Iraqis.362 
In the case of state-organized irregular defense forces, national SOF can be the 
source of expertise on how to make up for the lack of critical specialties. For SOF, cross-
training is fundamental to enhance the unit’s survivability in combat and the ability to 
conduct split-team operations.363 Moreover, SOF operators’ skillsets enhanced through 
cross-training also increase the team’s ability to operate as a force multiplier. Hence, from 
the standpoint of state-organized irregular forces, SOF personnel along with trained 
conventional military service-members could become the pillars around which members 
of other security forces and government agencies would be organized. These forces could 
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be further reinforced by civilians with specialized skills like armorers, amateur radio 
operators, mechanics, or former military members.364 This approach, of course well pre-
planned and prepared in peacetime, could make up for the deficiencies of the classic 
conscription system that would—besides its slowness—in the event of mobilization 
provide the nation’s military only with personnel of doubtful fighting value anyway.  
Analysis of the psychological casualties of war and their treatment is indeed out of 
the expertise of this author. However, from the standpoint of any commander at war, it is 
extremely important to recognize the mental strain that modern combat puts on combatants. 
For a commander of irregular forces, this issue poses even a bigger challenge considering 
the limited patient movement, evacuation, and hospitalization options. Indeed, the 
questions of how to treat this type of casualty must be left to experts. Nonetheless, 
commanders can also do their part to enhance the mental resilience of their troops and 
prepare them for the harshness of modern war.  
Mental stress and fear of being killed or injured are indeed inherent to war. 
However, as the authors of one study on combat stress during the Russo-Chechen wars 
indicate, urban combat is generally associated with significantly higher levels of combat 
stress than operations in rural areas.365 Operations in urban terrain often disintegrate into 
brutal and intense encounters between small infantry units that cannot fully exploit 
available artillery or air support. In Grozny, Russian troops faced highly motivated 
Chechen fighters led by skilled field commanders with superior knowledge of the 
battlefield. Conversely, for the Russian forces—still consisting mainly of conscripts—the 
immense psychological pressure of close quarter combat was further exacerbated by the 
lack of training and a poorly planned campaign.366 Major General V. S. Novikov, a 
professor in medical service, found that out of 1,312 Russian service-members he screened, 
 
364 Dach, Total Resistance, 10–11. 
365 Timothy L. Thomas and Charles P. O’Hara, “Combat Stress in Chechnya: “The Equal Opportunity 
Disorder”,” U.S. Army Medical Department Journal, (January-March 2000): 46, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a491562.pdf.  
366 Thomas and O’Hara, “Combat Stress in Chechnya,” 46. 
93 
72 percent exhibited some type of psychological disorder.367 According to Thomas and 
O’Hara, several factors bear on the level of combat stress and not all of them are combat-
related—many stressors are generated by decisions of unit commanders and mission 
demands.368 Perhaps the most obvious stressor—fear of being killed—can be, as Thomas 
and O’Hara continue, “curbed somewhat by proper preparatory training, good unit morale, 
proper leadership, and high state of an Army’s equipment quality and readiness.”369 
Prevention and treatment of psychological casualties can be further enhanced by the 
proximity of medical assets and psychological specialists capable of proper diagnosis and 
treatment of soldiers suffering from combat stress.370 These aspects, however, may pose a 
problem to irregular forces whose casualty evacuation options are generally limited. 
Therefore, the issues of the psychological effects of war must not be marginalized. In 
addition to Thomas’ and O’Hara’s findings on how to mentally prepare troops for 
combat—enhanced mental resilience through proper training, high unit spirit, good 
leadership, and high quality of equipment and readiness—irregular force commanders at 
all levels should be trained in how to discern the symptoms of combat stress and how to 
deal with them as first responders. Because even the most seasoned soldiers with the 
highest individual perseverance and endurance can finally break. Indeed, there is a great 
deal of truth in the words of one Russian officer who noted about Chechnya: 
The majority of analysts have arrived at the opinion that the course and 
outcome of modern war in large part will depend on the psychological 
condition of servicemen, their ability to endure an ever-increasing 
(psychological) load, overcome fear in battle, and preserve their will to 
win.371 
In many ways, the sustainment of irregular forces differs from the sustainment of a 
conventional army. Irregular force commanders are often forced to cope with the inability 
to secure their supply infrastructure against their conventionally much stronger enemies. 
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Besides limited resupply options, irregular forces may face problems related to the 
evacuation of casualties. Provision of rear services, including medical treatment, is not 
feasible to organize in the same manner as in the case of conventional armies with their 
developed logistic support. Thus, irregular force commanders must maximize their “out of 
the box” thinking to maintain operations of their forces.  
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IV. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY AHEAD 
There are two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing 
harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old idea out. 
       —B. H. Liddell Hart372 
Militaries have ever been built up for war—the violent encounter with an enemy 
which results often determine the fates of nations for decades. To increase their security 
and hedge against a failure at war, states employ diplomatic, information, military, and 
economic elements of national power. Nations look for allies, actively engage in the 
information domain to shape perceptions of the international community, employ armed 
forces to signal outside actors their intentions, or even make concessions to assuage 
external threats to their security. And when crises escalate, states count upon their armed 
forces being prepared well enough to win their wars and defeat the enemy. This goes for 
every country regardless of how powerful and influential.  
However, as far as conventional warfighting capabilities are concerned, small states 
are confronted with hard facts. As for a great power, the creation of a powerful combined 
arms military often depends only on the willingness to expend enough resources on military 
purposes.373 Conversely, small countries simply lack the resources to create a strong 
military-industrial complex required to back a combat effective conventional military. 
Conventional forces of small-nation militaries of course still play a significant role in 
various contingencies. A combination of a conventional lineup and unconventional 
irregular formations could be an effective way of how to take on the enemy through hit-
and-run tactics, physically and mentally imbalance him, and still engage him with heavy 
conventional firepower. However, as the history of human conflict indicates, a small 
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country’s prospects in a direct force-on-force confrontation with a great power are 
considerably grim. On the other hand, there are remarkable examples of asymmetric 
conflicts when an underdog imposed a heavy strain on superior enemy forces or even 
compelled a powerful actor to back down. However, behind the achievements of Lawrence, 
Tito, Giap, the Chechens, or various non-state actors, we should not seek rough force. Such 
an approach would only result in the destruction of their forces vis-à-vis superior enemy 
firepower; in the words of Liddell Hart, they would only move along the line of the enemy’s 
natural expectation.374  
This thesis covers the concept of irregular warfare and presents it as a feasible way 
of enhancing a small nation’s defense plans. This work automatically presupposes that a 
small state’s military simply cannot take a direct force-on-force approach against a great 
power’s military and still have a reasonable chance to fight back on equal terms. Irregular 
warfare is thus offered as a military strategy seeking to avoid a pitched battle and gradually 
harming the enemy mentally and physically until he realizes that a prolonged struggle is 
not within his interests. The strategy is analyzed through the lens of joint functions that 
help a commander to integrate, synchronize, and direct operations of forces under his 
command. An irregular force commander may have limited warfighting capabilities in 
comparison to his conventional counterpart; however, he generally deals with the same 
combat-related issues. Lawrence, Tito, Giap, or the Chechens also had to command and 
control their forces, shape the information environment, collect intelligence, and maneuver 
their forces into favorable positions to apply fires. They had to deal with the protection of 
their forces and sustain their troops for years on end. And above all, the masters of irregular 
warfare had to conduct combat operations often under the most demanding conditions 
against enemies overwhelmingly superior. 
The concept of irregular warfare proved its validity countless of times. So, what 
conclusions and lessons can be drawn and applied by a small-nation state and its military? 
First and foremost, the concept—whether we call it irregular warfare, guerrilla warfare, or 
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unconventional warfare, or we devise a new term—must be politically prescribed.375 A 
nation’s political and military leadership must carefully weigh all available resources and 
the most effective ways of their utilization to achieve national security objectives. 
Therefore, military officials must communicate closely with political representatives to 
provide them with a thorough analysis of a nation’s military strategy options including the 
concept of irregular warfare. Besides the issues concerning resources and their use, such 
an analysis should also highlight legislative matters that affect effective planning and 
preparation of an irregular warfare campaign. A country’s legal framework related issues 
and the method of solving them exceed the scope of this thesis and this author’s expertise. 
However, the framework itself poses a cornerstone of the nation’s efforts to plan and 
prepare for an irregular warfare campaign. Without it, any planning and preparation for an 
armed opposition during a country’s occupation cannot be taken further. 
The distinctiveness of irregular warfare confronts irregular force commanders with 
several challenges. The inherently decentralized character of irregular warfare operations 
requires an adequate command and control. Irregulars often operate under a considerable 
strain that hinders the flow of information and constrains the exertion of command 
authority. Therefore, for irregular forces to remain operational, decentralized C2 is 
paramount. Decentralized C2 to the lowest effective level possible is also necessary 
because of today’s rapidly changing operational environment. Due to increasing 
urbanization, cities and urbanized areas are the most likely future battlefields. And it is just 
the urban environment that allows an underdog at least to some extent degrade the 
formidable warfighting capabilities of modern combined arms militaries. However, as the 
recent examples of Grozny and Fallujah show, urban combat often resembles a series of 
dogfights where the tactical freedom of action is a prerequisite for success. This goes for 
regular military units as well as irregulars. The more decentralized C2, however, the more 
urgent is the need for capable subcommanders at all levels of command. In case of a nation-
state military, the competence of officers as well as non-commissioned officers must be 
assured through rigorous training and education that will bolster their boldness, initiative, 
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and imagination. Because of the extreme dynamics of war, blind adherence to rules and 
orders and lack of initiative often results only in impotence to exploit sudden and 
unexpected opportunities, heavier bloodshed, and mission failure.  
The ability to manipulate opponent’s perceptions and beliefs is critical. Even the 
side that has the upper hand by virtue of its conventional power can make great use of 
deception as some of the most famous undertakings in military history have proven. For 
the weak, deception is a game-changer that can remarkably increase an underdog’s ability 
to remain operational. However, the art of deception must be fostered across all branches 
of a nation’s military. It must become an inherent part of military education and training 
and be performed at all levels of warfare. Indeed, as the history of wars indicates, 
persistently practiced deception can be fruitful even at the lowest tactical level. Fritz 
Klingenberg’s seizure of Belgrade, Delta’s attempt to detain Karadzic, or cunning actions 
of the Chechens clearly demonstrate that deception is truly an art that must be nurtured and 
practiced by soldiers since their junior military years.376 For conventionally weaker forces, 
limited in numbers and firepower, deception may be the method of preserving forces and 
denying a superior enemy the decisive blow. This goes for regular as well as irregular 
forces, indeed.  
For every military force, regular or irregular, the ability to collect information on 
an enemy and turn it into actionable intelligence is crucial. However, the lack of 
intelligence on the enemy may expose irregular forces to an extremely dangerous situation. 
Knowledge of enemy positions and disposition, along with a general understanding of his 
intentions, allow irregular forces to evade any constant and long-term pressure which their 
ranks may not withstand. The irregulars’ most important source of information on enemy 
forces is the local populace. In the words of Liddell Hart, the guerrilla “can operate 
effectively and attain its end only when collectively backed by the sympathy of the 
 
376 The author is fully aware of the immense atrocities of the Waffen-SS during World War II, and the 
genocidal regime these soldiers were fighting for. However, from the purely military perspective, Waffen-
SS (and, after all, the entire Wehrmacht) performance during the war was one of the most impressive in the 
history of warfare. Klingenberg’s action is an excellent example of how combat effective a soldier well-
trained in tactics, boldness, and initiative can be.     
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masses.”377 This goes for intelligence collection as well. The importance of HUMINT for 
irregular forces is magnified by the fact that their other intelligence collection disciplines, 
or INTs, are limited.  
Nevertheless, the underdog’s technological inferiority can be, to some extent, offset 
by the broad trend of technology proliferation. The peculiar feature of the twenty-first 
century, sometimes known as the democratization of technology, has enabled non-state 
actors to access technology previously restricted for nation-states.378 This goes for 
surveillance technology as well. Commercial drones, Global Positioning System (GPS), 
smartphones with encrypted communication apps, and the internet are the best-known 
examples of people with ingenuity and technical skills creating makeshift data collection 
tools. In cyberspace, negligence, a common human trait, can be exploited by anybody with 
proper IT skills. These lessons should not be disregarded by a small-nation military. In the 
case of country’s occupation, people’s ingenuity to turn off-the-shelf technology into 
information collection tools and makeshift weapons should be considered as a way to 
increase combat readiness of a small-state military. As far as information collection is 
concerned, the digital age along with the proliferation of technology breeds various options 
of how a technologically less advanced side can collect enough data on an opponent and 
compete for information superiority.  
Irregular forces apply fires to create a specific effect on a target just like their 
conventional foes. Even though irregulars can make use of heavy weapons like tanks or 
artillery, the bulk of their armament should follow the need for greater mobility. Proven by 
numerous examples of asymmetric conflicts, light armament allows a conventionally 
weaker side to avoid a pitched battle and yet engage a much stronger enemy. This 
advantage can be further bolstered in an urban environment where enemy indirect fire 
support is naturally degraded. Chechen fighters, armed with rifles, machine guns, RPGs, 
grenades, and Molotov cocktails outran the Russians in Grozny and inflicted tremendous 
casualties. In case of a nation-state military, light armament can be remarkably enhanced 
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with high-tech weapons like killer drones and the latest versions of man-portable 
thermobaric, anti-tank, and air-defense systems. Such an inventory, along with encrypted 
communication and ISR capabilities, would be indeed lethal in the hands of well-trained 
and motivated soldiers.  
As far as the effect of fires is concerned, instead of seeking physical destruction of 
enemy forces, irregulars must be creative in targeting minds of enemy combatants and their 
domestic support by waging effective psychological operations. Commanders at all levels 
must be trained to ensure that every encounter with the enemy will be propagandistically 
exploited to the largest extent possible. The information age offers numerous ways to 
spread dis/information among a target audience. Societies not militaries wage war. Even 
authoritarian regimes can experience troubles when their peoples do not (often tacitly, 
though) approve military adventures abroad.  
Because of their inherent conventional weakness and lack of firepower, irregular 
forces must not flatter themselves that they could directly take on a conventionally superior 
enemy. Instead of massing on the enemy in a classic conventional maneuver, irregular 
forces must attempt to maximally extend enemy forces, avoid getting dragged in a pitched 
battle, and initiate contact only if surprise and relative superiority are achieved. Yet they 
must not become idle. As Liddell Hart put forward, “a guerrilla movement that puts safety 
first will soon wither. Its strategy must always aim to produce the enemy’s increasing 
overstretch, physical and moral.”379 The physical overstretch, achieved through the hit-
and-run actions of small dispersed teams, can be increased when irregulars operate in 
swarms, conducting simultaneous attacks on enemy forces from several directions. This 
approach, as John Arquilla emphasizes, requires a networked force “characterized by the 
dominance of lateral linkages among many small nodes, cells, or units,” led by field 
commanders enjoying a great deal of tactical freedom of action and operating in accord 
with the general intent of a central command that does not tend to micromanaging.380  
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Irregulars cannot rely on robust logistic infrastructure which would keep their 
forces in combat. Irregulars simply lack the means to maintain and protect a complex 
system comprised of facilities, LOCs, and troops transporting all kinds of supplies. This 
goes for a small-state military as well. Vis-à-vis a combined arms military of a great power, 
the military of a small state, due to its relative numerical and technological weakness, may 
not be able to maintain and protect its supply system. As Martin van Creveld notes,  
Logistics are the art of the possible. It is logistics that ultimately determine 
the maximum size of an army; whether it can operate; in what season it can 
operate; where it can operate; the distance it can get away from its bases, and 
for how long; the speed at which it can move; and so on.381 
One may add: against who it can operate, indeed.  
To make up for the fragile logistics and support, irregular forces rely on a well-
prepared network of safe houses, caches, assembly areas, and so on, organized and led by 
vetted and reliable personnel. These are the clandestine arteries that keep irregular forces 
operational. However, this system cannot be set ad hoc. It must be created in peacetime—
before a crisis arises. Therefore, the appropriate legal framework must exist which would 
allow to be set in motion the whole-of-government effort, including military planning and 
preparation. Without this effort, any preparation for an irregular warfare campaign would 
be only half-hearted.  
Protection of sensitive data concerning the force structure and personnel important 
for waging a state-organized irregular warfare campaign must be ensured. Technology in 
the digital age along with the anonymity of cyberspace allows malicious actors to perform 
actions with potentially severe repercussions for national security. Besides, as the OPM 
hack demonstrates, cyber intrusion may not be immediately detected or the purpose of such 
an action may not be immediately clear enough. Considering the extent of the OPM hack 
and the intelligence value of the stolen data, it is not hard to realize the seriousness of such 
an attack if it happens to a country which the defense plan incorporates a phase of resistance 
during occupation.  
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OPSEC must be strictly enforced, too. As the Russian operations in Crimea 
confirm, negligent OPSEC at the tactical level may jeopardize ongoing operations and 
subvert the war effort at the strategic level. Neither does OPSEC lose its importance during 
peacetime. In today’s connected world with the widespread use of social media and the 
internet it is quite easy to omit vigilance. Then even seemingly harmless apps could become 
a source of intelligence value that could be utilized by an adversary. On the other hand, 
such opportunities must not be dismissed by the weak for whom it may be a viable way to 
exploit the missteps of the powerful.  
As for a small-nation military, recognition of irregular warfare as a strategic 
military option would require a significant change of organizational culture and mindset. 
This may indeed be the most difficult part of the overall turnaround in the small-nation 
military’s perception of irregular warfare. A clear example is the current situation in 
Europe. Many countries which today can be reasonably considered militarily weak and 
unequipped to fight a great power on anything like equal terms were just thirty-five years 
ago preparing for a gigantic clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.382 Putting the 
political nonsense aside, the militaries of the former Eastern bloc posed a formidable 
fighting force. Some of the current highest-ranking commanders in small-nation NATO 
militaries started their junior officer careers in strong conventional armies of the Cold War 
era. However, due to geopolitical changes, transformation of the security environment, and 
considerable cuts in military spending, today they command militaries that struggle to 
retain main conventional warfighting capabilities. Yet these militaries too often pursue the 
concept of combined arms structures requiring resources and technologies that are not 
available. To alter this trend, a general change of mentality must occur. It should embrace 
a change in the general perception of the role of the military instrument of national power, 
doctrinal changes, and transformation of military education and training.  
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This thesis does not specifically address the question of organizational structure. 
This is chiefly because the organizational issue is so comprehensive that it would require 
separate research. Moreover, every state poses a unique combination of geopolitical 
standing, geography, and human, material, and financial resources with a distinctive 
command structure and composition of its armed forces. Hence, each nation’s military 
must come up with its own analysis of how to shape command structures capable of 
commanding inherently networked irregular forces. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue,  
For governments and militaries, the challenge will be to develop hybrids in 
which “all-channel” networks are fitted to flattened hierarchies… Since 
militaries must retain hierarchical command structures at their core, their 
hybrids should retain—yet flatten—the residual hierarchy, while allowing 
dispersed maneuver “nodes” to have direct, all-channel contact with each 
other, and with the higher command.383    
However, for many small states and their militaries, to meet this challenge will 
require an internal change in understanding the new security environment. To paraphrase 
Liddell Hart, this would be the hardest part. However, once the change comes through, the 
physical part, like creation of appropriate command structures, procurement of weapons 
and armament, training of forces, plus the country’s military preparations and strategic 
planning will be much easier. The result will be the creation of combat effective armed 
forces, led by skillful commanders at all levels of command, capable of waging an irregular 
warfare campaign against a conventionally much stronger enemy. David will be given the 
sling to fight Goliath.  
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